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CORPORATE CULTURE AND COMPETITION COMPLIANCE 
IN EAST ASIA 
 Jingyuan Ma*         
Mel Marquis** 
Abstract 
Efforts to secure competition law compliance among 
commercial operators can usefully be tailored in a way 
that takes account of cultural characteristics.  Since 
culture forms part of the conditions in which the 
development of a robust and credible compliance system 
occurs, it makes sense to approach compliance issues in 
a manner sensitive to that cultural background.  In the 
context of East Asian enterprises, this implies a need to 
take account of the legacy of Confucian ethics, which has 
had a profound influence on the psychology and 
behavior of commercial organizations in the region.  The 
importance of that legacy suggests that compliance will 
not be achieved within East Asian firms solely on the 
basis of the external legal environment, an environment 
in which deterrence-oriented factors such as sanctions 
and the threat of detection play a central role.  More 
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attention should be given to the internal moral and social 
environment, and to shaping the logic of 
appropriateness within a given firm.  A compliance 
culture can thus be constructed on the basis of elements 
such as moral commitment, Eastern-style education, the 
cultivation of virtue, and the convergence of the interests 
of the enterprise and those of its employees.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Since the early 1990s, antitrust authorities have taken 
actions to encourage companies to implement 
compliance programs, thereby raising the likelihood that 
they conform to the requirements of antitrust law. Such 
actions include offering reductions in fines, 1  issuing 
compliance guides,2 and producing YouTube videos, or 
                                                          
 
 
1 See, e.g., Guidance as to the Appropriate Amount of Penalty, OFF. OF 
FAIR TRADING (2012), 
http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/284393/oft423.pdf. 
2 See, e.g., Drivers of Compliance and Non-Compliance with 
Competition Law: An Oft Report, OFF. OF FAIR TRADING (2010), 
http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/284405/oft1227.pdf; How your Business can Achieve Compliance with 
Competition Law, OFF. OF FAIR TRADING (2011), 
http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/284402/oft1341.pdf; Promoting Compliance with Competition, ORG. 
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (2012) [hereinafter OECD], 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Promotingcompliancewithcompetiti
onlaw2011.pdf. See also United States Sentencing Commission, 2015 US 
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even cartoons, to aid compliance training.3  In the United 
States, if an offending firm has implemented a 
compliance program, it may be taken into account when 
the authorities decide whether the enterprise will be 
prosecuted, whether it should be rewarded with a fine 
reduction, and during any settlement negotiations.4  In 
Australia, Canada, France, India, Israel, Italy, Singapore, 
South Africa, and the United Kingdom, the effectiveness 
of existing compliance programs will be considered by 
the competition authority when calculating fines or in the 
context of settlements.5  Among those authorities, some 
                                                          
 
 
SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL (2015), 
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2015-guidelines-manual. 
3 See Benefits of Competition Policy for Consumers, Eur. Comm’n on 
Competition http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_en.html 
(April 16, 2012); Ted Banks & Joe Murphy, The International Law of 
Antitrust Compliance, 40 DENVER J. INT’L LAW & POL’Y 368, 373-4 (2012); 
see NMaMovie, Leniency in Cartel Cases, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2008), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5diFAaJdweI; see also 
Konkurrensverket, Be the First to Tell - A Film about Leniency, YOUTUBE 
(Mar. 3, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_r99qzC8aHA. 
4 See Banks & Murphy, supra note 3, at 376 (citing United States 
Att’ys’ Manual, STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE 9-28.000, (2018) 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcr
m.htm#9-28.800). 
5 See Banks & Murphy, supra note 3, at 379-80.  Subject to variations 
and nuances, certain jurisdictions including Australia, Brazil, Canada, the 
UK and the US provide for the possibility of fine reductions for companies 
with effective compliance programs. Other authorities, including notably 
the European Commission and most European competition agencies (with 
some exceptions) maintain the opposite policy and refrain from granting 
fine reductions. See, e.g., Eva Lachnit, Compliance Programmes in 
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(such as those in the United States, 6  Canada, 7  The 
Netherlands, 8 and France 9) provide guidelines on the 
key elements and tools that should be incorporated in a 
compliance program, whereas others, such as the 
competition authority in Singapore,10 provide standards 
that will be used to evaluate whether, in the authority’s 
view, the compliance program is effective.11 
The latter point concerning Singapore illustrates the 
fundamental point that adopting a compliance program 
is not sufficient; the crucial issue is whether a well-
                                                          
 
 
Competition Law: Improving the Approach of Competition Authorities, 10 
UTRECHT L. REV. 31, 46 (2014). 
6 See US Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 2.  
7 See Corporate Compliance Programs, CAN. COMPETITION BUREAU 
(Jan. 3, 2015), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/eng/03927.html. 
8 See Lachnit, supra note 5, at 38. 
9 The French competition authority (the Autorité de la concurrence) 
has issued compliance guide brochures in English and French (Antitrust 
compliance and Compliance Programmes - Corporate Tools for Competing 
Safely in the 
Marketplace)http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/brochure_confor
mite_uk.pdf (2018); see also, Framework Document on Antitrust 
Compliance Programmes, AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE (2012), 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/framework_document_complia
nce_10february2012.pdf. 
10 See Guidelines on the Appropriate Amount of Penalty, COMPETITION 
COMMISSION OF SINGAPORE, https://www.cccs.gov.sg/legislation/cccs-
guidelines (last updated Jan. 24, 2019). 
11 See Banks & Murphy, supra note 3, at 382. 
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designed compliance program is effectively and 
sustainably implemented. 12   The current debate on 
corporate compliance is largely based on optimal 
deterrence theory—it revolves around the use of 
“carrots” (fine reductions) and “sticks” (criminal 
penalties) to induce compliance. 13   However, the 
deterrence model has some shortcomings. 14   In the 
                                                          
 
 
12 The need to consider not just the existence of a compliance program 
but also its effectiveness is stated succinctly by Transparency International-
USA in the anti-corruption context: “Verification reviews should focus on 
two questions: is the program well-designed and is the program operating 
effectively?” Verification of Anti-Corruption Compliance Programs, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L-USA (2014), 
https://www.coalitionforintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/TI-
USA_2014_verificationreportfinal.pdf. 
13 See generally Anne Riley & Daniel Sokol, Rethinking Compliance, 
3 J. ANTITRUST ENF. 31 (2015). 
14 See Kevin Kennedy, A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence 
Theory, 88 DICK. L. REV. 1, 7-11 (1983) (highlighting objections to 
deterrence theory that are based on, inter alia: the occasionally unrealistic 
nature of the rational actor model; a lack of convincing proof of causation 
between sanctions and deterrence; deterrence theory’s indifference to 
morality; paradoxes such as the fact that the specific deterrent effect of 
sanctions has already failed if the sanction must be administered once an 
offense has been committed; certain classic critiques of utilitarianism, for 
example that it instrumentalizes human beings or is, even worse, “sadistic” 
in nature; and the possibility that the “ambiguity that often pervades the 
punishment message can diminish the deterrent effect”). See also KAREN 
YEUNG, SECURING COMPLIANCE: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH 63-72 (2004) (on 
the issue of the deterrence theory’s assumption that firms carefully weigh 
the costs and benefits of illegal conduct and thus respond rationally to 
prescribed punishments, Yeung notes that “empirical studies suggest that 
corporations are not solely driven by self-seeking individuals concerned 
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context of compliance programs, no clear empirical 
evidence demonstrates a causal link between the threat 
of sanctions and effective compliance, and surveys show 
that business practitioners are often unaware of 
compliance requirements in relation to antitrust law.15  
Research also shows that severe sanctions alone are 
unlikely to achieve deterrence and optimal compliance. 
An effective motivation to comply with the law is better 
secured by increasing the perceived value of such 
compliance and increasing the perceived risk that 
misconduct will be detected.16   
                                                          
 
 
exclusively with the pursuit of profit, but who may be motivated, at least 
partially, by non-financial concerns, including a sense of social 
responsibility and respect for the rule of law.  If so, then attempting to deter 
commercial firms from committing offences on pain of punishment may be 
only weakly effective, and perhaps less effective, than the use of non-
punitive strategies to encourage compliance.”). 
15 See D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance, and What 
Practitioners Really Think about Compliance, 78 ANTITRUST L. J. 201 
(2012). 
16  See Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, The ACCC 
Enforcement and Compliance Survey: Report of Preliminary Findings, 
ANU CENT. FOR COMPETITION AND CONSUMER POL’Y (December 1, 2005), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=906945 (summarizing national survey of business 
practitioners in Australia regarding their attitudes, beliefs and experiences 
on compliance with respect to competition and consumer protection law and 
with respect to the enforcement activities of the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission); Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, 
Mixed Motives: Economic, Social and Normative Motivations in Business 
Compliance, 34 L. & POL’Y 428 (2012). See also Christine Parker, The 
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Despite such problems with deterrence-based 
strategies to promote compliance, some competition 
agencies decline to explore the possibility of putting 
more attention on rewarding enterprises that show a bona 
fide commitment to compliance.17  The use of carrots 
(notably in the form of fine reductions) to incentivize 
companies to design and implement competition 
programs18 has been criticized.19 
                                                          
 
 
“Compliance” Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory 
Enforcement, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 591 (2006) (recommending responsive 
regulation as a means of “leveraging” deterrence). See generally Christine 
Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, Deterrence and the Impact of 
Calculative Thinking on Business Compliance with Regulation, 56 
ANTITRUST BULL. 377 (2011). 
17  The European Commission explains its policy in the following 
terms.: “If a company which has put a compliance programme in place is 
nevertheless found to have committed an infringement of EU competition 
rules, the question of whether there is any positive impact on the level of 
fines frequently arises.  The answer is: No.  Compliance programmes should 
not be perceived by companies as an abstract and formalistic tool for 
supporting the argument that any fine to be imposed should be reduced if 
the company is ‘caught.’  The purpose of a compliance programme should 
be to avoid an infringement in the first place.”  Compliance Matters: What 
Companies Can Do Better to Respect EU Competition Rules 21, EUR. 
COMMISSION (2012), https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/78f46c48-e03e-4c36-bbbe-aa08c2514d7a/language-en. 
18 See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust 
Agencies’ Bi-Modal Penalties, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 127, 146-47 
(1997). 
19 See Andreas Stephan, Why the UK’s New Approach to Competition 
Compliance Makes for Good Enforcement, 1 CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 
(2012); Wouters Wils, Antitrust Compliance Programmes and Optimal 
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As the debate on the desirability of rewarding 
compliance programs proceeds, there is not a clear 
consensus on how to determine whether a compliance 
program is effective, and there is no universal template 
for the content of such a program.  It is true that efforts 
have been made to create and expand a set of ingredients 
for an effective compliance program. 20  On the other 
hand, many have pointed out that compliance programs 
are not “one size fits all,” although overall objectives and 
                                                          
 
 
Antitrust Enforcement, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENF. 52 (2012); Damien Geradin, 
Antitrust Compliance Programmes and Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: A 
Reply to Wouter Wils, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENF. 325 (2013); Andreas Stephan, 
Hear no Evil, See No Evil: Why Antitrust Compliance Programmes May Be 
Ineffective at Preventing Cartels, CCP WORKING PAPER 09-09 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107587/1.122147!ccp09
-9wp.pdf; D. Daniel Sokol & Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Antitrust Corporate 
Governance and Compliance, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L 
ANTITRUST ECON. VOL. 2 586 (2014). 
20 For example, Joe Murphy and William Kolasky have listed twenty 
features on an ‘effective’ compliance program. See Joe Murphy & William 
Kolasky, The Role of Anti-Cartel Compliance Programs in Preventing 
Cartel Behavior, 26 ANTITRUST 61 (2012). See also Christine Parker & 
Sharon Gilad, Internal Corporate Compliance Management Systems: 
Structure, Culture and Agency, EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUS. RESPONSES 
TO REG. (Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011); 
Christine Parker et al., The Two Faces of Lawyers: Professional Ethics and 
Business Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETH. 201 
(2009); Gary Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Programs as Control 
Systems: Influences of Executive Commitment and Environmental Factors, 
42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 41, 42 (1999). 
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principal features may be identified.21  Indeed, the same 
type of compliance program may function differently in 
firms with different organizational cultures.22  Similar to 
other competition enforcement instruments—such as 
criminal sanctions, severe fines,23 leniency programs,24 
                                                          
 
 
21 See, e.g., Joe Murphy, One Size Fits All: A Flawed Approach to 
Company Compliance Programs (2012), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/CartelCol
umnApril-2.pdf; OECD, supra note 2, at 13 (2012) (“Delegates and private 
sector representatives agreed that ‘one size fits all’ approaches to designing 
compliance programmes are not advisable because each sector and firm is 
so different. However, clarifying the overall objectives and principal 
features of good competition programmes can be helpful. There is general 
agreement that these objectives can be summarized as ‘the 5 C’s’: (i) 
Commitment, (ii) Culture, (iii) Compliance know-how and organization, 
(iv) Controls and (v) Constant monitoring and improvement. Genuine 
compliance programmes are taken seriously at every level of the 
corporation, and they involve regular training, audits, screening and 
updates.”). 
22 This argument is likely reinforced by the consideration that, like the 
proverbial “black box,” the internal workings and cultures of different firms 
may be impervious to observation.  See Ronald J. Mann & Curtis J. 
Milhaupt, Foreword, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 317, 323 (1996). See also Daron 
Acemoglu & Simon H. Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. ECON. 
949 (2005) (explaining the importance of policy and the protections it 
allows). 
23  See, e.g., Sanghyun Lee, Using Action in Damages to Improve 
Criminal Penalties Against Cartels: Comparative Analysis of Competition 
Law of United States and South Korea, 16 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L. J. 55 
(2007). 
24  See ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE: 
LENIENCY RELIGION 149 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Christopher Tran eds., 
2015) [hereinafter LENIENCY RELIGION]. 
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and individual liabilities—it is thought that compliance 
programs should be implemented all around the world,25 
and yet, at the same time, there are doubts about whether 
the same enforcement tool can be transplanted with 
success in a vast number of countries with starkly 
different backgrounds and cultures. 26  
This article proposes that corporate culture has a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of compliance, 
since corporate culture contributes to the shaping of 
incentives and constraints in a firm and thereby drives 
behavior.  Competition law compliance and the 
promotion of compliance by stakeholders external to the 
firm should be cognizant of, and where appropriate 
should be tailored to take account of, the corporate 
cultures found in a given country or relevant geographic 
space.  It is argued that the effectiveness of compliance 
mechanisms will largely depend on the extent to which 
such mechanisms are embedded within the culture of 
local businesses and local communities, 27  and 
                                                          
 
 
25 See John M. Connor, Global Antitrust Prosecutions of International 
Cartels: Focus on Asia (2008), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1027949. 
26 See Anzhela Korzhevskaya, Achieving a Competition Compliance 
Culture in Russia: Assessing the UK Experience in Compliance 
Programmes to Deter Cartels, 3 RUSS. L. J. 62 (2015). 
27 See, e.g., Theodore Banks, Antitrust Compliance—It’s All About the 
Culture, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 1 (2012) 
http://www.canadianadvertisinglaw.com/antitrust-compliance-its-all-
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compatible with relevant social norms. 28   Where 
sensitivity to these features is lacking, a competition 
authority may be incapable of distinguishing between 
cosmetic and genuine compliance. 29   As the work of 
other commentators reveals, the objective should be to 
trigger a deep transformation of internal corporate 
culture and business ethics, as this may be the only sure 
way to secure robust compliance with the law.30 
                                                          
 
 
about-the-culture/. A more general debate on this issue relates to the cultural 
barriers that condition the prospects of success for legal transplants. This 
debate, particularly prominent since the 1970s, originates from 
Montesquieu’s work The Spirit of Laws (Livre I) (Gallimard 1749) 
(reprinted: J.P. Mayer & A.P. Kerr eds., 1970).  Whereas legal 
commentators (characterized as “legal scientists”) such as Judge 
Easterbrook, propose sets of assumptions and criteria that purport to be 
capable of application anywhere irrespective of cultural-historical 
distinctions, “legal culturalists” such as Legrand and Hall argue that law is 
unique, locally based, and “untranslatable.”  See Pierre Legrand, 
Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to Theory, 58 MODERN L. REV. 
262 (1995); Stuart Hall, Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms, 2 MEDIA 
CULTURE & SOC’Y 57 (1980). 
28 Law and anthropology scholars often claim that law is a form of 
local “knowledge.”  See Janet Ainsworth, Categories and Culture: On the 
Rectification of Names in Comparative Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 19, 28 
(1996).  As argued by Clifford Geertz, “local” refers not only to place, time, 
class and variety of issue but also to “accent,” which is closely linked to 
particularized local norms.  See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: 
FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167-234 (3rd ed, 2000). 
29 See generally Miriam H. Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 
50 B. C. L. Rev. 1 (2009); Wils, supra note 19. 
30 See LENIENCY RELIGION, supra note 24, at 301.  
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This article proposes that the discourse on 
compliance efforts and their effectiveness would be well 
served by explicitly considering the relevance of 
corporate culture, which may have distinct local 
characteristics.  In this context, local culture can be 
relevant in two ways.  First, there is a clear need to 
incentivize companies to establish an internal 
compliance program to prevent, or at least quickly 
detect, illegal conduct (e.g. price fixing, market sharing, 
bid-rigging and the like).  Further, a firm’s incentives to 
invest in compliance efforts are more likely to be 
successful if enforcement policies go far beyond the 
precarious assumption that “optimal deterrence” will 
produce optimal compliance.  The second consideration, 
which concerns the wider public (including small 
businesses) is that enforcement by a competition agency, 
as well as judicial enforcement and the contributions of 
civil society, should all aim to demonstrate the harmful 
effects of cartels and establish a social norm that morally 
condemns them.31 
These arguments are raised with the example of East 
Asian firms, which have been influenced by Confucian 
                                                          
 
 
31  We are not alone in calling for broader public awareness and 
stigmatization of cartels.  See, e.g., Andreas Stephan, Cartel Laws 
Undermined: Corruption, Social Norms, and Collectivist Business 
Cultures, 37 J. L. & SOC’Y 345, 350 (2010). 
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beliefs and by particular corporate organizational 
cultures.  The underlying contention is that if business 
success in East Asia has been culture-driven,32 then a 
successful approach to competition law compliance 
should likewise be culture-driven.  This article begins 
with the observation that in East Asia parts of Confucian 
philosophy have substantially shaped cultural and 
societal norms for thousands of years.33  Confucianism 
provided the fundamental basis for ancient jurisprudence 
                                                          
 
 
32 For the argument that the post-WWII economic success of East Asia 
is culture-driven, see Michael Bond & Geert Hofstede, The Cash Value of 
Confucian Values, CAPITALISM IN CONTRASTING CULTURES 383-90 (S.R. 
Clegg & S.G. Redding eds., 1990). A few studies have attributed the 
economic success of East Asian countries to Confucian business ethics.  
See, e.g., Gary Kok Yew Chan, The Relevance and Value of Confucianism 
in Contemporary Business Ethics, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 347 (2008); Edward 
Romar, Globalization, Ethics, and Opportunism: A Confucian View of 
Business Relationships, 14 BUS. ETHICS Q. 663 (2004); Kit-Chun Joanna 
Lam, Confucian Business Ethics and the Economy, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 153 
(2003); Daryl Koehn, Confucian Trustworthiness and the Practice of 
Business in China, 11 BUS. ETHICS Q. 415 (2001). 
33 See Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Culture Matters: Cultural Differences 
in the Reporting of Employment Discrimination Claims, 20 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS J. 405, 437 (2011). “No other philosophy has so deeply influenced 
the life and thought of the East Asian people and character. Though many 
profess to be Taoist, Buddhist, or Christian, they also simultaneously 
profess to be Confucianist, as Confucianism has become an inseparable part 
of East Asian thought and society, and synonymous with what it means to 
be East Asian.” In particular contexts this expansive statement may need to 
be tempered, as some societies exhibit some but not all of the classical 
Confucian characteristics, and other influences have certainly also left their 
own imprints. 
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and imperial governance in East Asia,34 and it became 
the source of a “common Asian Law.” 35   Ancient 
Confucian laws and philosophical norms in East Asia 
have deeply influenced the organization of social 
activities, the collective (un)conscious, and the behavior 
of individuals in a wide variety of contexts. 36   This 
distinctive cultural heritage and value system may 
impede the re-modeling of corporate governance 
according to assumptions and criteria of western, rule-
based regimes. 37   Although there is a focus on 
competition law as a specific sphere of business 
regulation, the discussion in this article illustrates more 
generally that compliance programs should be tailored to 
take account of and if possible, harness the paradigms of 
societal and business culture.  
                                                          
 
 
34 See CHONGKO CHOI, EAST ASIAN JURISPRUDENCE (2009). 
35 Takao Tanase, Global Markets and the Evolution of Law in China 
and Japan, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 873, 877 (2006). 
36 See, e.g., Kim, supra note 33. 
37 See Kun Luen Alex Lau & Angus Young, Why China Shall not 
Completely Transit from a Relation Based to a Rule Based Governance 
Regime: A Chinese Perspective, 21 CORP. GOVERNANCE.: AN INT’L REV. 
577 (2013) (explaining that relation-based governance was influenced by 
Confucian doctrines and moral codes regulating behavior and relationships 
and that, since relation-based governance is culturally embedded, firms in 
China are unlikely to abandon it entirely in favor of a rule‐based system 
imported from the West.).  
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A caveat is required because there are many 
variations in business and management cultures in 
Asia. 38   This article acknowledges past criticism of 
attempts to link pre-modern beliefs with modern 
business organizations, and the risk of over-reliance on 
culture-based—plus for that matter institution-based—
explanations.39  Cognizant of the criticisms relating to 
the linear model of organizational culture and business 
performance, 40  and of the pitfalls of overestimating 
                                                          
 
 
38 See Managing Across Diverse Cultures in East Asia: Issues and 
Challenges in a Changing Globalized World (Malcolm Warner ed., 2013); 
Michael Minkov & Vesselin Blagoev, Is There a Distinct Asian 
Management Culture?, 20 ASIA PAC. BUS. REV. 209 (2014).   
39 See Barry Wilkinson, Culture, Institutions and Business in East 
Asia, 17 ORG. STUD. 421 (1996) (critical of both culturist and institutionalist 
perspectives, since each may lead to a determinist account that ignores 
human agency and neglects the issues of interests, power and ideology in 
business structures); Contra Sid Lowe, Culture and Network Institutions in 
Hong Kong: A Hierarchy of Perspectives. A Response to Wilkinson: 
‘Culture, Institutions and Business in East Asia, 19 ORG. STUD. 321 (1998) 
(criticizing Wilkinson’s article and emphasizing, inter alia, the importance 
of social, political, economic and other influences that provide context for 
corporate behavior). 
40 For criticisms on the overly simple nature of the studies on corporate 
culture and organizational performance, see DANIEL R. DENISON, 
CORPORATE CULTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (1990); JOHN 
P. KOTTER & JAMES L. HESKETT, CORPORATE CULTURE AND PERFORMANCE 
(1992); Daniel Carroll, A Disappointing Search for Excellence, 6 HARV. 
BUS. REV. 78 (1982); George Gordon & Nancy Ditomaso, Predicting 
Corporate Performance from Organizational Culture, 29 J. MGMT. STUD. 
83 (1992); Paul Reynolds, Organizational Culture as Related to Industry, 
Position and Performance: A Preliminary Report, 23 J. MGMT. STUD. 333 
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cultural factors to explain managerial issues in ethnic 
Chinese business,41 this article nevertheless argues that 
corporate culture, which is a reflection of societal 
culture, partly determines the character and functioning 
of an organization and that, consequently, corporate 
culture may be an important factor in the development 
and operation of internal compliance systems.  This 
article therefore identifies certain elements of East Asian 
corporate culture and considers how they might be 
further integrated into the design of compliance 
programs in order to enhance the effectiveness of 
competition laws to the benefit of societies that rely on 
market institutions. 
 The analysis is structured as follows.  Part two 
argues that approaches to competition law compliance 
                                                          
 
 
(1986); Guy Saffold III, Culture Traits, Strength and Organizational 
Performance: Moving Beyond “Strong” Culture, 113 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
546 (1988). 
41 See Yuan Lu et al. Knowledge Management and Innovation Strategy 
in the Asia Pacific: Toward an institution-based view, 25 ASIA PAC. J. 
MGMT. 361, 374 (2008) discussing the theme of “Managing in Ethnic 
Chinese Communities.” For an overview of the contributions to the Special 
Issue, see David Ahlstrom et al., Managing in Ethnic Chinese Communities: 
Culture, Institutions, and Context, 27 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 341, 344-9 
(2010).  Traditionally, many economists tended to be very negative towards 
the explanatory power of culture. As Amir N. Licht once vividly noted: 
“culture used to have a bad name among economists.  It was not particularly 
popular among lawyers [either]. One reason probably was that culture is 
very difficult to observe. One therefore may fear that people would resort 
to cultural explanations when they run out of good ones, as the former 
would be impossible to disprove ….” Amir Licht (2014), Culture and Law 
in Corporate Governance, ECGI L. Working Paper No. 247/2014, 15 
(2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405538 (last visited July 30, 2018). 
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should be culture-driven in the sense that culture should 
be considered and if possible, harnessed to enhance the 
quality and effectiveness of compliance.  Part three 
begins by summarizing Confucian values and the impact 
of Confucianism on the general business environment.  
Specifically, this article discusses the influence of 
Confucian values by reference to three dimensions: 
hierarchy-based leadership, the role of family in 
business, and the interaction between internal and 
external actors.  Part four discusses the theoretical and 
empirical literature on organizational culture, examines 
management studies and corporate governance, and 
identifies the organizational culture of East Asian 
companies according to different ownership types (i.e. 
state-owned companies, family businesses, and foreign-
invested companies).  Empirical literature from business 
and management studies on corporate and organizational 
culture in China, Japan, and Korea will be discussed in 
order to highlight the characteristics of companies in 
each country.  This connection considers how 
competition law compliance could be facilitated by 
taking account of Confucian values and patterns of 
organizational culture.  Part five focuses on competition 
law compliance and reflects on how it may be possible 
to harness cultural norms to enhance compliance efforts 
in this context. 
II. CORPORATE CULTURE AND COMPETITION 
COMPLIANCE 
A. CORPORATE CULTURE AS AN INTERNAL CONTROL 
FORCE 
Almost every organization has common values to 
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maintain as a united entity.42  Likewise, every business 
entity embodies certain values and corporate culture.43  
As with the concept of culture itself, defining “corporate 
culture” or the similar notion of “organizational culture” 
presents difficulties. 44  According to Edgar Schein, 
organizational culture is: “a pattern of shared basic 
assumptions that the group learned as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration 
that has worked well enough to be considered valid and 
therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way 
to perceive, think and feel in relation to those 
problems.” 45   Jay B. Barney defines organizational 
culture as “a complex set of values, beliefs, assumptions, 
and symbols that define the way in which a firm conducts 
its business.” 46   Similarly, Rohit Deshpande and 
                                                          
 
 
42 See Jennifer Chatman & Karen Jehn, Assessing the Relationship 
Between Industry Characteristics and Organizational Culture: How 
Different Can You Be?, 37 ACAD. MGMT.  J. 522, 525 (1994); John Van 
Maanen & Stephen R. Barley, Toward a Theory of Organizational 
Socialization, 6 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 287 (1984). 
43 See Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological 
Interpretation (1957). 
44 For example, A.L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn claimed already 
in the 1950s that 164 different meanings of “culture” had been identified in 
anthropology and sociology. See A.L. Kroeber & Clyde Kluckhohn, 
Culture: A Critical Review of the Concepts and Definitions (1952). 
45 EDGAR SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 11, 12 
(2nd ed. 1992). 
46  Jay B. Barney, Organizational Culture: Can It Be a Source of 
Sustained Competitive Advantage?, 11 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 656, 657 (1986). 
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Frederick Webster describe organizational culture as 
“patterns of shared values and beliefs that help 
individuals understand organizational functioning and 
thus provide them with norms for behaviors in the 
organization.”47  As Terrence Deal and Allan Kennedy 
point out, corporate culture is the “commercialized” 
version of organizational culture. 48  The definition of 
corporate culture provided by Jerald Greenberg and 
Robert Baron suggests that, similar to the concept of 
“culture” itself, corporate culture refers to the behavioral 
norms, values, and expectations within an 
organization. 49   Literature reviews provided by other 
authors shared the view that corporate culture consists of 
behavioral norms and “codes of conduct,” expressed in 
varying combinations of formal and informal terms, and 
that such norms and codes are generally understood and 
accepted by the members of the organization.50 
                                                          
 
 
47  Rohit Deshpande & Frederick E. Webster, Jr., Organizational 
Culture and Marketing: Defining the Research Agenda, 53 J. Marketing 3, 
4 (1989). 
48 See Terrence E. Deal & Allan A. Kennedy, Corporate Cultures: The 
Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life (1982). 
49 See Jerald Greenberg & Robert A. Baron, Behavior in Organizations 
544 (9th ed, 2008). 
50 See, e.g., Golnaz Sadri & Brian Lees, Developing Corporate Culture 
as a Competitive Advantage, 20 J. Mgmt. Dev. 853 (2001); Choong Y. Lee 
& Jennifer Y. Lee, South Korean Corporate Culture and Its Lessons for 
Building Corporate Culture in China, 9 J. Int’l. Mgmt. Stud. 33, 34 (2014).  
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Business and management literature distinguish 
between strong and weak corporate culture. 51  Strong 
cultures are a source of competitive advantage, 52 
organizational effectiveness, 53 innovation,54 and better 
financial performance. 55  It has also been argued that 
corporate culture can be an instrument of “social 
control”56 and can complement other control systems to 
change incentives and preferences. 57   Empirical 
                                                          
 
 
51 See Barney, supra note 46. 
52 See id.; Denison, supra note 40; Kotter & Heskett, supra note 40; 
Charles O’Reilly, Corporations, Culture, and Commitment: Motivation and 
Social Control in Organizations, 31 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 9 (1989); Alan 
Wilkins & William Ouchi, Efficient Cultures: Exploring the Relationship 
Between Culture and Organizational Performance, 28 Admin. Sci. Q. 468 
(1983); Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy (1985). 
53 See Daniel R. Denison & Aneil K. Mishra, Organizational Culture 
and Organizational Effectiveness: A Theory and Some Preliminary 
Empirical Evidence, 6 ORG. SCI. 204-223 (1995); Denison, supra note 40. 
54 See Charlan Jeanne Nemeth & Barry M. Staw, The Tradeoffs of 
Social Control and Innovation in Groups and Organizations, 22 Advances 
in Experimental Social Psychology 175 (Leonard Berkowitz, ed., 1989). 
55 See THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF 
EXCELLENCE (1982); NOEL M. TICHY, MANAGING STRATEGIC CHANGE: 
TECHNICAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS (1983); Shinichi Hirota 
et al., Does Corporate Culture Matter? Evidence from Japan, WIAS 
Discussion Paper No.2008-001 (2008), 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/46881754.pdf. 
56 See Charles A. O’Reilly & Jennifer A. Chatman, Culture as Social 
Control: Corporations, Cults, and Commitment, 18 RES. ORG. BEHAVIOR 
(Barry Staw & Larry Cummings, eds., 1996).  
57 See Luigi Guiso et al., Social Capital as Good Culture, 6 J. EUR. 
ECON. ASS’N. 295 (2008); Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Corporate Culture and 
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literature shows that corporate culture has a direct 
influence on corporate performance.58  For example, the 
empirical study by Shinichi Hirota demonstrates that 
companies with strong culture managed to survive 
during the business fluctuations, recession, and banking 
crisis of 1997.59  Economic literature portrays culture as 
a substitute for contracts in that it can solve coordination 
problems within sizable firms.60  As Barney explained, 
organizational culture not only has “pervasive effects” 
that are sustainably applied to customers, suppliers, and 
competitors, it also affects how these actors engage with 
each other. 61   The literature reviewed above thus 
                                                          
 
 
the Nature of the Firm, TRANSACTION COST ECON. & BEYOND 249 (Jo 
Groenewegen ed., 1996). 
58  See, e.g., Rohit Deshpandé et al., Corporate Culture, Customer 
Orientation, and Innovativeness in Japanese Firms: A Quadrad Analysis. 
57 J. Marketing 23 (1993); Daniel R. Denison & Aneil K. Mishra, Toward 
a Theory of Organizational Culture and Effectiveness, 6 Org. Sci. 203, 203-
04 (1995); Jin Han et al., Market Orientation and Organizational 
Performance: Is Innovation a Missing Link?, 62 J. MARKETING 30 (1998). 
59 See Hirota et al., supra note 55. 
60 See David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, 
PERSP. ON POSITIVE POL. ECON. 90 (James Alt & Kenneth Shepsle eds., 
1990). According to Robert Cooter and Melvin Eisenberg, the cultural norm 
of fairness was a “stable platform” serving to induce cooperative behavior 
of agents and thus promoting productive firm behavior. See Robert Cooter 
& Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character and Efficiency in Firms, 149 
U. PA L. REV. 1717 (2001). For a detailed review of some of the economic 
literature on corporate culture, see BENJAMIN E. HERMALIN, ECON. & CORP. 
CULTURE (1999). 
61 See Barney, supra note 46, at 657. 
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provides a helpful landscape for organizational behavior, 
although understanding specific organizational, 
commercial decisions, or both also requires a focused 
examination of the business functions of the entity 
concerned as well as its incentives, constraints, and a 
variety of other factors that depend on the relevant facts 
and circumstances. 
B. COMPLIANCE AS AN INTERNAL FORCE FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
In many jurisdictions there has been an increasing 
use of criminal sanctions and individual liabilities to 
sanction cartel behavior.62  However, empirical evidence 
shows that the effectiveness of severe penalties is often 
insufficient because business people often ignore or 
rationalize messages they receive and their knowledge 
about anti-cartel law is often limited.63  For example, a 
survey of 567 business people in Australia by Christine 
                                                          
 
 
62 See, e.g., Jingyuan Ma & Mel Marquis, Moral Wrongfulness and 
Cartel Criminalization in East Asia, 36 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1-63 
(forthcoming, 2019) (discussing the uneven but growing international trend 
toward harsher penalties and criminal sanctions in cases where cartel laws 
are violated). 
63 See Christine Parker & Chris Platania-Phung, The Deterrent Impact 
of Cartel Criminalisation: Supplementary Report on a Survey of Australian 
Public Opinion Regarding Business People’s Views on Anti-Cartel Laws 
and Enforcement http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026725 (last visited August 1, 
2018). 
2019  CORPORATE CULTURE & COMPETITION COMPLIANCE  23 
 
 
Parker and Chris Platania-Phung indicated that, although 
at that time cartels had been criminalized for over a year 
in Australia (since 2010), fewer than half of the 
respondents realized that cartel behavior was a criminal 
offense. 64   Furthermore, many of the respondents 
believed that the risk of being caught for cartel activities 
was low, and that, hypothetically speaking, they would 
not be detected in the context of their own 
circumstances. 65   More recently, a 2014 telephone 
survey of around 1,200 private sector businesses in the 
United Kingdom (UK) revealed that, despite higher 
levels of awareness of competition law among large UK 
enterprises compared to smaller firms, an overall 
remarkably low rate of nineteen percent (19%) of the 
respondent firms engaged in discussions at senior level 
of the requirements of competition law (compared to a 
seventy-eight percent (78%) rate for health and safety).66  
Only six percent (6%) of the respondents held 
                                                          
 
 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
66 See IFF RESEARCH, UK BUS.’ UNDERSTANDING OF COMPETITION L. 
28 (2015) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/429876/UK_businesses__understanding_of_competition_law_-
_report.pdf. For discussion, see Barry Rodger, Competition Law 
Compliance: The CMA 2015 Study, Compliance Rationales and the Need 
for Increased Compliance Professionalism and Education, 36 EUR. COMP. 
L. REV. 423 (2015). 
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competition law training sessions for employees.67  Only 
twenty-three percent (23%) considered that they know 
competition law well, and twenty percent (20%) had 
never heard of it68—a disappointing result later seized by 
the UK Comptroller and Auditor General.69  It is also 
quite telling that nineteen percent of respondents thought 
that the “Federal Trade Commission,” a rather 
widelyknown organ of the American federal 
government, was responsible for enforcing competition 
law in the UK. 70   Considering the significant 
transparency of the enforcement and outreach efforts of 
the Office of Fair Trading and its successor, the 
Competition and Markets Authority, these figures from 
the UK can hardly bode well for other jurisdictions 
worldwide.71 
Considering the findings from the above studies in 
Australia and the UK, many observers and anti-trust 
regulators recognize that merely increasing cartel 
penalties and enhancing detection by means of leniency 
programs are unlikely to achieve the goal of effective 
                                                          
 
 
67 See UK BUSINESSES’ UNDERSTANDING, supra note 66, at 5, 30. 
68 Id. at 5, 31. 
69 See The UK Competition Regime, UK NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, 8, 
27-28 (2016), https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/The-
UK-Competition-regime.pdf. 
70 See UK BUSINESSES’ UNDERSTANDING, supra note 66, at 57. 
71 See id. at 59. 
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enforcement, unless, those measures are complemented 
by suitable and widespread compliance programs.72 
C. COMPLIANCE SHOULD BE CULTURALLY DRIVEN  
Much of the global debate about corporate 
compliance in the field of competition law fails to push 
past a discussion of the external consideration of carrots 
and sticks and to consider compliance as an internal 
force that can change values, norms, and behavior within 
the corporation.73  Seen from this perspective, culture 
and cultural change within organizations should be high 
on the agenda.74  In light of the above-reviewed evidence 
                                                          
 
 
72  Some commentators recommend making the grant of immunity 
under a leniency program conditional on the establishment of a well-
designed compliance program. See, e.g., Brent Fisse, Reconditioning 
Corporate Leniency: The Possibility of Making Compliance Programmes a 
Condition of Immunity, 
https://www.brentfisse.com/images/Fisse_Compliance_Programs_as_Con
dition_of_Corporate_Immunity_201114.pdf 
73 See, e.g., Riley & Sokol, supra note 13, 34-36 (arguing that the 
discourse on competition law compliance should not only revolve around 
punishment and penalty mitigation but should aim at changing the 
“normative values” of the corporation). 
74 On the importance of culture, see, e.g., LAI CHEN, THE CORE VALUES 
OF CHINESE CIVILIZATION (2016); Calvin Boardman & Hideaki Kiyoshi 
Kato, The Confucian Roots of Business Kyosei, 48 J. BUS. ETHICS 317, 318 
(2003); Rick Hackett & Gordon Wang, Virtues and Leadership: An 
Integrating Conceptual Framework Founded in Aristotelian and Confucian 
Perspectives in Virtues, 50 MGMT. DECISION 868, 889 (2012); Liang-Hung 
Lin & Yu-Ling Ho, Confucian Dynamism, Culture and Ethical Changes in 
Chinese Societies—A Comparative Study of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, 
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suggesting a strong relationship between organizational 
culture and corporate performance, this article argues 
that competition regulators and practitioners should shift 
their focus from the deterrence-based enforcement 
model towards a more culturally-driven compliance 
model.75 The debate on compliance, this article submits, 
should not treat corporations as “black boxes”; such an 
entity should instead be studied taking account of the 
details of the corporate culture of the entity and the 
manner in which that culture shapes norms and 
behavior.76  Since corporate culture in East Asia reflects 
more than two millennia of Confucian civilizations, this 
article will turn to an overview of the Confucian tradition 
and its relevance to the present discussion. 
                                                          
 
 
20 INT’L J. HUM. RES. MGMT. 2402, 2043 (2009); Shu-hsien Liu, A 
Philosophic Analysis of the Confucian Approach to Ethics, 22 PHIL. EAST & 
WEST 417, 424 (1972). 
75 See generally CHEN, supra note 74; Boardman &  Kato, supra note 
74 (explaining the effects of implementing kyosei virtues into corporate 
culture to reward proper behavior); Hacket & Wang, supra note 74 
(discussing the importance of leaders using confusion values in the business 
world); Liang-Hung Lin & Yu-Ling Ho, supra note 74 (explaining cultural 
transformation can diversify behaviors in a corporation); Shu-hsien Liu, 
supra note 74 (discussing confusion ethics and its importance to achieving 
rationality). 
76 See Riley & Sokol, supra note 13, 46-48. 
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III. CONFUCIAN TRADITION AND CORPORATE CULTURE 
IN EAST ASIA 
A. CONFUCIAN TRADITION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT  
The starting point for studying corporate culture in 
East Asian companies is to understand the long and 
profound tradition of Confucianism and its ethical 
values, which have had a continuing influence on the 
work attitudes of employees in modern organizations.77  
This tradition has even affected employees’ cognitive 
processes and their metaphysical beliefs. 78  
Confucianism, which is not a single strand of philosophy 
but a family of related traditions that evolved over 
centuries,79 has had a dominant and enduring influence 
on economic activities and business organizations in 
East Asian countries. 80   In China, for example, a 
Confucian system of self-regulated governance was a 
                                                          
 
 
77 See, e.g., Bih-Shiaw Jaw et al., The Impact of Culture on Chinese 
Employees’ Work Values, 36 PERSONNEL REV. 128, 129-32 (2007). 
78 See Richard Nisbett et al., Culture and System of Thought: Analytic 
and Holistic Cognition, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 291, 299-305 (2001). 
79 See Jingyuan Ma & Mel Marquis, Business Culture in East Asia and 
Implications for Competition Law, 51 TEX. INT’L L. J. 1, 7 n.31 (2016) 
(Confucianism consists not just of the contributions of Confucius himself 
but on a “multitude of subsequent and sometimes famous scholars, 
interpreters, and glossators,” leading to many sub-strands of Confucian 
thought and ethics). 
80 See Ma & Marquis, supra note 79, 9-10. 
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functional equivalent for company law for centuries until 
the first company law, largely transplanted from 
European civil codes, was implemented in 1904. 81  
Today, in mainland China and Hong Kong, Confucian 
concepts are still relevant when businesses make 
corporate governance decisions. 82   Confucianism has 
likewise deeply influenced values in Korea and has 
significantly shaped (together with other influences 
including Christianity) inter-personal relations in both 
social and work environments.83  Confucianism in China 
has enjoyed a cautious resurgence over the last three 
decades; many of its fundamental precepts are 
acknowledged and respected by the government, 
particularly because it represents an alternative to 
Western-style systems and ideologies.84  In September 
1999, the government officially celebrated the 2,550th 
                                                          
 
 
81 See Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: 
Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1677 (2000). See also Alex Chu Kwong Chan & Angus 
Young, Chinese Corporate Governance Regime from a Historical-Cultural 
Perspective: Rethinking Confucian System of Governance, 3 (2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2156300 (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2018). 
82 See Chan & Young, supra note 81, at 28. 
83 See Tan Soo Kee, Influences of Confucianism on Korean Corporate 
Culture, 36 ASIAN PROFILE 9, 9 (2008). 
84 See e.g., Jeremy Page, Why China is Turning Back to Confucius, 
WALL ST. J., (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-china-is-
turning-back-to-confucius-1442754000 (last visited Aug. 1, 2018). 
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birthday of Confucius in Qufu, his hometown in 
Shandong Province. 85   Another celebration was held 
worldwide in 2014 for Confucius’s 2,565th birthday.86  
With regard to business culture both in China and among 
the widely dispersed Chinese diaspora, Confucian values 
are indispensable to understanding the behavior, 
organization, and management of family businesses.87 
It is significant that the East Asian business ethos did 
not entirely lose its Confucianist character even when the 
1997 financial crisis jolted the South Korean and 
Japanese economies and prompted substantial reforms to 
corporate governance.88  As part of those reforms, and 
following the Anglo-American model, independent 
                                                          
 
 
85 See Jun Yan & Ritch Sorenson, The Effect of Confucian Values on 
Succession in Family Business, XIX FAM. BUS. REV. 235, 248 (2006). 
86 See China Central Television News, broadcast of (Sept. 28, 2014) 
(in Chinese), http://news.cntv.cn/special/jkr/index.shtml (last visited Aug. 
1, 2018). 
87 See Jean Lee, Culture and Management - A Study of Small Chinese 
Family Business in Singapore, 34 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 63 (1996); Murray 
Weidenbaum, The Chinese Family Business Enterprise, 38 CALIF. MGMT. 
REV. 141 (1996); Richard Whitley, The Social Construction of Business 
Systems in East Asia, 12 ORG. STUD. 1 (1991); Yan & Sorenson, supra note 
85, at 248. 
88  See Lilian Miles & S.H. Goo, Corporate Governance in Asian 
Countries: Has Confucianism Anything to Offer?, 118 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 
23, 24-25, 37-38 (2013) (In relation to Japan, that “[l]ifetime employment, 
collectivism, and pursuit of harmony continue to characterize Japanese 
corporate governance, and the traditional keiretsu system of related party 
transactions, reinforced by cross-shareholdings will continue to exist.”). 
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directors were recruited and internal financial reporting 
and corporate control were strengthened, yet many of the 
core values defined by Confucian doctrine, such as 
collectivism and the pursuit of harmony, remained 
unchanged or have since re-emerged in East Asian 
companies. 89   Janis Sarra and Masafumi Nakahigashi 
have argued that, although the Commercial Code and the 
Audit Special Exception Code took effect in Japan in 
2003 and aimed at introducing Anglo-American 
elements of corporate governance, local culture and 
business norms in Japan should never be overlooked.90  
The corporate board in Japan is still “like a small 
community” with a consensus-building culture. 91  
Workers’ representation on corporate boards is 
dependent upon employees’ long-term loyalty and 
commitment, and promotion depends to a large extent on 
contributions to the team, rather than on individual 
achievements.92  According to Sarra and Nakahigashi, 
although there has been a perception that Japanese 
corporate law has shifted towards the corporate 
                                                          
 
 
89 See id. at 37-38 (stating in relation to China, the authors note “the 
enduring influence of Confucius on Chinese culture, despite the ongoing 
corporate governance reforms along Anglo-American lines”). 
90 See Janis Sarra & Masafumi Nakahigashi, Balancing Social and 
Corporate Culture in the Global Economy: The Evolution of Japanese 
Corporate Structure and Norms, 24 LAW & POL’Y 299, 330 (2002). 
91 See id. 
92 See id. at 339. 
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governance model prevalent in North America since the 
Commercial Code was amended in 2003, the key 
traditional elements in business ethnic and corporate 
culture remain constant.93  
Moreover, the long-standing Confucian tradition is 
also often manifested in informal institutions.94  These 
institutions play the role of guiding principles and 
polices in doing business; they remove conflicts while 
strengthening information flow, trust, and mutual 
understanding within and among business firms. 95  
Many have claimed that these informal institutions and 
cultural norms bridge the gap between formal legal 
institutions and the judicial system, and sometimes 
provide more efficient solutions.96 
Collective behavioral and decision-making norms, 
strong internal hierarchical relationships, moral values, 
                                                          
 
 
93 See id. 
94 See Chenting Su et al., Enabling Guanxi Management in China: A 
Hierarchical Stakeholder Model of Effective Guanxi, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 301 
(2007). 
95 See id. 
96 See Ricky Y.K. Chan et al., The Dynamics of Guanxi and Ethics for 
Chinese Executives, 41 J. BUS. ETHICS 327 (2002); see also Sven Horak & 
Andreas Klein, Persistence of Informal Social Networks in East Asia: 
Evidence from South Korea, 33 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 673, 677 (2016) 
(“Several authors point out the efficiency and flexibility guanxi offers as a 
substitute to sometimes unclear and frequently changing rules and policies.  
In business, guanxi is effective in resolving conflicts more easily than the 
judicial system.” (citations omitted)). 
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and family and community ties are often regarded as 
constituting typical Asian or Confucian values.”97  In the 
following sections, this article focuses on five main 
aspects of corporate culture in East Asian companies that 
derive from Confucianism influences.  Specifically, this 
article discusses: paternalistic leadership, family 
ownership, corporate governance, rules of business 
ethics, external relations (e.g., the relations between a 
given enterprise and other entities), and social 
responsibilities.  
B. CONFUCIAN TRADITION AND CORPORATE CULTURE  
While Confucian values and the Confucian ethical 
system were originally designed for application at the 
micro level in the family and at the macro level of the 
government of the Chinese empire, they have also had a 
defining role in East Asian commercial life.98  Indeed, 
                                                          
 
 
97 See Russell Dalton & Doh Chull Shin, Weber’s Theory of Capitalism 
in Confucian East Asia, CITIZENS, DEMOCRACY, AND MARKETS AROUND 
THE PACIFIC RIM: CONGRUENCE THEORY AND POLITICAL CULTURE 159, 174-
79 (Russell Dalton & Doh Chull Shin eds., 2006) (As observed by Kim, the 
literature highlights four dimensions of Asian values: familialism, 
communalism, authority orientation, and work ethic.); see So Young Kim, 
Do Asian Values Exist? Empirical Tests of the Four Dimensions of Asian 
Values, 10 J. EAST ASIAN STUD. 315 (2010). 
98 See, e.g., Marc Dollinger, Confucian Ethics and Japanese 
Management Practices, 7 J. BUS. ETHICS 575, 575-76 (1988) (describing the 
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the influence of Confucianism in the business 
environment throughout East Asia has been credited for 
the Asian values of hard work, education, thrift, and 
social order that fueled the economic miracle of the four, 
so-called, tigers (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore).99 
In Korea, for example, Confucian values contributed 
to the economic development and industrialization in the 
1960s and 1970s.100  There, the Confucian tradition was 
fused with strong economic nationalism and provided an 
important cultural and ideological basis for the economic 
development of the country.101  Important aspects of that 
tradition—loyalty, respect for authority and for elders, 
self-cultivation, and harmony in the workplace and in 
families—were all incorporated as part of the modern 
work ethic. 102   In the 1980s and 1990s, harmony, 
                                                          
 
 
importance of Confucian moral concepts and social duties in relation to 
Japanese business management styles). 
99 See Angus Young et al., Corporate Governance in China: The Role 
of the State and Ideology in Shaping Reforms, 28 COMPANY LAWYER 204, 
205 (2007).  Use of the term “tigers” in reference to Hong Kong, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore seems to have been popularized originally by 
the World Bank; See WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY 2, 24, 37-38 (1993). 
100 See Andrew Eungi Kim & Gil-sung Pak, Nationalism, 
Confucianism, Work Ethic and Industrialization in South Korea, 33 J. 
CONTEMP. ASIA 37, 39 (2003). 
101 See id. at 45. 
102 See id. at 44. 
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solidarity, and cooperation were the most prominent 
company mottos in South Korean enterprises. 103  
“Family” is frequently used as a metaphor, both within 
the company104 and also to describe relationships with 
other firms; for example, terms such as moche (“mother 
company”) and jamaehoesa (“sister companies”) are 
common expressions in business. 105   Analogous 
vocabulary is found in Japan as well, as illustrated by the 
terms oya gaisha (“parent company”), kogaisha (“child 
company”), and magogaisha (“grandchild 
company”). 106  Of course, expressions such as parent 
company and daughter company are also found in many 
other parts of the world, but there may be somewhat 
deeper psychological associations in countries where, as 
in Japan, the company often assumes a family-like 
                                                          
 
 
103 See Roger Janelli, Making Capitalism: The Social and Cultural 
Construction of a South Korean Conglomerate, 239 (1993).  
104 See, e.g., Yung-Ho Cho & Jeonkoo Yoon, The Origin and Function 
of Dynamic Collectivism: An Analysis of Korean Corporate Corp. Culture, 
7 Asian Pac. Bus. Rev. 70, 76 (2010) (noting that CEOs in Korea emphasize 
“strong family-like bonds among employees,” and that CEOs adopt the role 
of a father figure).   
105 See Kim & Pak, supra note 100, at 44-5. 
106 See Gregory Ornatowski, Confucian Values, Japanese Economic 
Development, and the Creation of a Modern Japanese Ethics, INT’L BUS.  
ETHICS: CHALLENGES AND APPROACHES 386, 395 (Georges Enderle ed., 
1999) (discussing Japanese business terms); Chan, supra note 32, at 348 
(citing Ornatowski and referring to the same terms). 
2019  CORPORATE CULTURE & COMPETITION COMPLIANCE  35 
 
 
role. 107   Furthermore, the prominence of Confucian 
values in East Asian companies may also be 
distinguished by the use of such values as motivational 
tools.108  In 1989, Hak Chong Lee conducted a survey of 
seventy-seven (77) Korean companies and found that 
words and phrases central to Confucian moral values, 
such as diligence, social responsibility, unity, reliability, 
and sacrifice, were emblazoned on the walls of factories, 
offices, and elevators. 109   Lee found these values 
positively motivated workers to make determined efforts 
to achieve the goals of the company.110 
While Japan’s economic afflictions in the 1990s 
sharply distinguished the country from the four tigers, 
some of the same Confucian values have also profoundly 
influenced Japanese business culture. 111   Famously, 
loyalty to one’s organization or company, often as part 
of a lifelong reciprocal commitment, is of crucial 
                                                          
 
 
107 On the traditional role of the Japanese company serving in some 
circumstances as a substitute for the family, see Ma & Marquis, supra note 
79, at 11 (f n.75) (“First-born sons in Japan inherited the family business 
and other assets, leaving younger sons to strike out on their own with their 
new employers assuming a role akin to an adopted family.”). 
108 See Hak Chong Lee, Managerial Characteristics of Korean Firms, 
KOREAN MANAGERIAL DYNAMICS 147, 160-61 (Kae Chung & Hak Chong 
Lee eds., 1989) (achieving company goals was also regarded as consistent 
with the goals of the nation). 
109 See id. at 149. 
110 See id. at 160-61. 
111 See generally Dollinger, supra note 98. 
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importance to employees.112  When employees mention 
their company, instead of saying they are “working for 
Toyota,” they would say that they “belong to Toyota.”113  
Similarly, when young people were recruited by large 
companies in China, they moved from other parts of the 
country to company dormitories and they called the 
company their new home. 114  These young workers 
expect companies to organize collective activities in the 
spheres of culture, education, or sports, and to develop 
their potential in a paternalistic environment. 115    In 
Japan, senior managers require young employees to 
listen to and obey their commands and promotion can 
only be expected when the employees meet relevant age 
requirements, which prove they have spent sufficient 
time in the company.116  Furthermore, loyalty and trust 
are not only important for the relationship between 
managers and employees, but also important for business 
partners and even competitors to nurture and maintain.117  
Norimasa Furuta, then-President of Mazda, expressed a 
                                                          
 
 
112 See Ma & Marquis, supra note 76, at 27-28. 
113 See Charles Rarick, The Philosophical Impact of Shintoism, 
Buddhism, and Confucianism on Japanese Management Practices, 7 INT’L 
J. VALUE-BASED MGMT. 219, 223 (1994). 
114 See Colin Hawes, Representing Corp. Culture in China: Official, 
Academic and Corp. Perspectives, 59 CHINA J. 33, 37 (2008). 
115 See id. 
116 See Rarick, supra note 113, at 224. 
117 See id.  
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typical sentiment in this regard as he once said in 
reference to automobile manufacturers, “strategic 
alliances” need to be formed with competitors and 
suppliers in order to achieve success. 118   This article 
interprets Furuta’s statement as reflecting a particular 
ethos and worldview not driven merely by 
considerations such as the integration of complementary 
assets and the achievement of synergies.   
C. INFLUENCES OF CONFUCIAN CULTURE ON THE 
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
1. Paternalistic Leadership  
The concept of role-based relationships emphasized 
by Confucianism has had a profound influence on 
business entities in East Asia. 119   By analogy to the 
fundamental principle of filial piety in the family, 
superiors expect employees at an inferior level to respect 
them and follow orders. 120  Paternalistic leadership is 
                                                          
 
 
118 See id. at 223. See also Thomas Bellows, Bridging Tradition and 
Modernization: The Singapore Bureaucracy, in CONFUCIANISM AND ECON. 
DEV.: AN ORIENTAL ALTERNATIVE? 195, 195-96 (Hung-chao Tai ed., 1989). 
119  See, e.g., John Hill, Confucianism and the Art of Chinese 
Management, 1 J. ASIA BUS. STUD. 1, 8-9 (2006) (focusing on links between 
Confucianism and elements of Chinese management culture such as its 
emphasis on paternalism and personal relationships). 
120  As one might expect, the exaltation of obedience has been 
criticized, in particular because it may curb creativity in private and 
professional settings.  See Kyung Hee Kim, Exploring the Interactions 
 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF 
38 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS VOL. 15.1 
 
 
 
another prominent feature of Chinese family businesses 
in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Indonesia.121  In 
a family enterprise, it is often the head of the family that 
adopts the relevant business policies, and his decision-
making power is highly authoritarian and 
discretionary. 122   Supervisors expect subordinates to 
implement their policy by interpreting the boss’s idea 
carefully, and disagreements can only be expressed in a 
polite, indirect way through private and personal 
channels.123  With the patriarch or the matriarch acting 
as the head of the company, key members of the family 
hold executive positions, and when kinships link 
subsidiaries, a network of companies can be formed; 
                                                          
 
 
between Asian Culture (Confucianism) and Creativity, 41 J. CREATIVE 
BEHAV. 28, 34 (2007) (“Overemphasis on following rules and traditions at 
work creates organizational barriers to creative innovation …. Creative 
potential is only realized in work situations where employees can influence 
decision-making and communicate new ideas ….” (citations omitted)); 
Another obvious weakness of historical Confucianism is that it 
systematically undervalued women and generally deprived them of voice. 
See id. at 37-38. 
121 See GORDON REDDING, THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE CAPITALISM 143, 
156-69 (1990). See also Robert Westwood & Andrew Chan, Headship and 
Leadership, in ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.: A SOUTHEAST ASIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 123 (Robert Westwood ed., 1992).  
122  See Gordon Redding, The Conditional Relevance of Corporate 
Governance Advice in the Context of Asian Business Systems, 10 ASIA-PAC. 
BUS. REV. 272, 285 (2004). 
123 See Min Chen, Asian Management Systems 73 (2d ed. 2004). 
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ownership is thus distributed throughout the family.124  
Given the complex and sometimes concealed 
relationships within the company, it often takes time for 
an outsider, such as independent non-executive 
directors, to access core information.  For these reasons, 
the role and functions of outsiders can be merely 
symbolic.125 
The majority of leadership studies concerning 
Chinese business organizations have concluded that 
paternalistic rule is the prevalent leadership type. 126  
                                                          
 
 
124  See Ming-Jer Chen, Inside Chinese Business: A Guide for 
Managers Worldwide 26 (2001). 
125  See Angus Young, Corporate Governance in China and Hong 
Kong: Reconciling Traditional Chinese Values, Regulatory Innovation and 
Accountability 1, 12 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533904 (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2018).  The role of independent directors in Korea is likewise rather 
limited. See also Amir Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance Cross-
Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform 22 Berk. J. Int’l Law 195, 225 
(2004) (“[A] truly independent director may be considered an outsider 
rather than an outside director.  Even if perceived as an integral part of the 
group of board members (and to the extent that this is so), it would be 
difficult for her to identify the complex cases and to ask the hard questions.  
This is not to say that independent directors would be worthless in Korea 
.…  Yet the trend toward giving independent directors greater pride of place 
is somewhat puzzling.”). 
126 See Chin-Yi Chen et al., Spiritual Leadership, Follower Mediators, 
and Organizational Outcomes: Evidence from Three Industries Across Two 
Major Chinese Societies, 42 J. APP. SOC. PSYCH. 890, 923 (2012); Bor-
Shiuan Cheng et al., Paternalistic Leadership and Subordinate Responses: 
Establishing a Leadership Model in Chinese Organizations, 7 ASIAN J. SOC. 
PSYCH. 89, 90-92 (2004). 
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Decision-making power is often centralized at the top or 
at least at the level of senior management.127  Michael 
Witt and Gordon Redding’s study on the institutional 
characteristics of thirteen Asian business systems 
(mainland China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Vietnam) shows that top-down decision -
making and internal hierarchical structures are 
commonly observed in Asia.128  Top managers usually 
have the major decision-making power, and among the 
above-mentioned thirteen systems, the only exception 
was Japan, which features a participatory model.129 
Studies on the organizational culture in Chinese 
firms have incorporated theories of management, 
organizational science, and leadership behavior. 130  
                                                          
 
 
127 See Lee & Lee, supra note 50, at 37. 
128 See Michael Witt & Gordon Redding, Asian Business Systems: 
Institutional Comparison, Clusters and implications for Varieties of 
Capitalism and Business Systems Theory, 11 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 270 (2013). 
See also Jeffrey Podoshen et al., Materialsm and Conspicuous 
Consumption in China: A Cross-Cultural Examination, 35 INT’L J. 
CONSUMER STUD. 17, 18 (2011). 
129 See Witt & Redding, supra note 128. See also Ma & Marquis, supra 
note 79, at 16, 28 (discussing the unusual ringiseido system in corporate 
Japan). 
130 See generally Daniel Denison et al., Corporate Culture in Chinese 
Organizations, in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND 
CLIMATE 1, 561 (Neal Ashkanasy et al. eds., 2nd edn 2010); Denison & 
Mishra, supra note 53, 205-07.  
2019  CORPORATE CULTURE & COMPETITION COMPLIANCE  41 
 
 
Although the styles of management are clearly 
influenced by multiple factors, few authors would 
disagree that traditional values informed both the 
philosophy management and the psychological 
motivations underlying the behavior of employees and 
employers.131  A particular feature of the management 
style of Chinese companies is the dominant role of 
leaders, 132 who may be the local managers at foreign 
firms doing business in China 133  or foreign-based 
                                                          
 
 
131 See Lee Cheuk Yin, Do Traditional Values Still Exist in Modern 
Chinese Societies?  The Case of Singapore and China, 1 ASIA EUR. J. 43, 
57 (2003). Yin points out that traditionalism is not manifest uniformly in 
Asian societies. Yin points out that “circumstances in various regions differ 
greatly. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have a richer ambience of 
indigenous cultural tradition, whereas Hong Kong and Singapore are more 
‘‘westernized.’ … What the people [in the latter countries] still widely 
accept and preserve are the basic tenets of individual moral conduct and 
interpersonal relations in Confucianism. These do not come from classical 
tradition, but mainly from implicit influence from within the family and 
subtly internalized moral values. Some call this ‘secular Confucianism’ or 
‘popular Confucianism,’ others deem it to be hybridized with Buddhist and 
Taoist values and therefore can no longer be called ‘Confucianism.’ 
(footnotes omitted).  
132  See Zhi-Xue Zhang et al., Business Leadership in the Chinese 
Context: Trends, Findings, and Implications, 10 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 199, 
204 (2014). 
133  See Crystal Zhao, Management of Corporate Culture Through 
Local Managers’ Training in Foreign Companies in China: A Qualitative 
Analysis, 9 INT’L J. TRAINING & DVPMT 232, 232-35 (2005) (showing that 
local managers play an important role in foreign companies located in 
China, and that the main values, beliefs of foreign corporate culture are 
mainly applied through the management practices of local managers). 
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Chinese managers of Chinese firms operating 
overseas.134  In these settings of Chinese management, 
leaders have a tendency to be less reliant on formal 
contracts. 135   Leaders are paternalistic; and at least 
ideally, they combine discipline, authority, fatherly 
benevolence, and moral integrity.136  Among East Asian 
countries, hierarchical structures and paternalistic 
leadership are especially prevalent in Chinese, 137  and 
Korean companies.138  The rules of the game are evident 
down to the level of concrete behavioral ritual, for 
example, in both China and Korea, elders as well as 
persons of higher social status, are granted priority to 
initiate activities, such as being the first to enter the 
                                                          
 
 
134 See Stijn Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control 
in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FINAN. ECON. 81, 82-83 (2000); John Kao, 
The Worldwide Web of Chinese Business, 71 HARV. BUS. REV. 1, 24 (1993). 
135  See CHEN, supra note 123, at 80.  As Chen noted, “[i]n an 
environment structures by the implicit rules of loyalty and mutual 
obligation, a contract is seen as unnecessary at best and offensive at worst.  
Historically, important deals have been executed among Chinese firms 
without legal contracts of any kind.” A paper contract can symbolize 
suspicion and fear, and it “implies that the obligations and loyalty of 
partnership are not taken seriously, and it is rarely resorted to among 
Chinese businesses as a means of protecting the parties against each other.”  
136 See Zhang et al., supra note 132, at 204.  
137 See Min Wu & Erica Xu, Paternalistic Leadership: From Here to 
Where?, in HANDBOOK OF CHINESE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.: 
INTEGRATING THEORY, RES. AND PRAC. 449 (Xu Huang & Michael Bond 
eds., 2012). 
138 See Kee, supra note 83. 
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room, or being served food first during a business 
banquet, and so on.139  Senior officials, who are often the 
decision makers, are unwilling to meet negotiating teams 
with junior members. 140   A company expects a 
hierarchical and reciprocal relationship—similar to the 
respective roles of father and son—between superiors 
and their subordinates.141  Similar patterns are observed 
in family firms and state-owned businesses, where 
managers and employees tend to fulfill reciprocal 
obligations; superiors expect subordinates to perform 
duties and show respect, while subordinates expect 
superiors to lead with loyalty, fairness and justice.142  In 
Korea, companies employ a highly centralized and top-
down decision-making process. 143   Personnel policies 
relate closely to seniority and embody unwavering 
respect for elders. 144   In such an environment, the 
authoritarian nature of leadership and decision-making 
makes it difficult for employees to express dissenting 
opinions. 145   The exchange of ideas during business 
                                                          
 
 
139 See Choong Lee, Korean Culture and Its Influence on Business 
Practice in South Korea, 7 J. INT’L MGMT. STUD. 184, 186 (2012). 
140 See id. at 187. 
141  See Wei-Ming Tu, Probing the “Three Bonds” and “Five 
Relationships” in Confucian Humanism, in CONFUCIANISM AND THE 
FAMILY 121, 122-23 (Walter Slote & George De Vos eds., 1998). 
142 See Kee, supra note 83, at 13.  
143 See id. at 14. 
144 See Lee, supra note 137, at 185. 
145 See Kee, supra note 83, at 15. 
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meetings, particularly between juniors and senior 
managers, becomes infrequent and psychologically 
challenging, leaving many insightful and creative views 
unvoiced. 146   It is worth adding that, in this type of 
environment where work relationships are highly 
personal and relation-based, two studies conducted by 
Zhen Xion Chen show that the performance of 
employees correlates more strongly with their loyalty to 
a supervisor than with commitment to the 
organization. 147   Loyalty to the supervisor strongly 
influences employees’ attitudes.148  
The above discussion highlights a contrast between 
the structured, process-oriented style and rule-based 
style that tends to characterize governance in the 
West.149  In East Asian business, as demonstrated above, 
corporate governance is generally relation-based, top-
down, structured, stable, informal, and less 
                                                          
 
 
146  See id. See also Kim, supra note 120, at 34 (referring to 
organizational barriers to creative innovation arising from rigid business 
hierarchies that dampen the input of subordinates in decision-making).  
147 See Zhen Xiong Chen et al., Loyalty to Supervisor vs. 
Organizational Commitment: Relationships to Employee Performance in 
China, 75 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORG. PSYCHOL. 339, 343 (2002). 
148 See Chen, supra note 147, at 340.  
149 See Shaomin Li et al., The Great Leap Forward: The Transition 
from Relation-Based to Rule-Based Governance, 33 ORG. DYNAMICS 63, 
64-66 (2004). 
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transparent.150  However, paternalistic leadership is also 
credited for the superior performance of many 
multinational companies.  First, Zhang Riumin, an 
authoritarian but also benevolent CEO, led the Haier 
Group to great commercial success.151  Similarly, Li Ka-
Shing, Chairman of the Cheung Kong Group (today, CK 
Hutchinson) has had enormous success with his 
businesses and has become a legendary figure in Hong 
Kong while earning the status of Knight Commander 
(KBE) of the Order of the British Empire.152  Having 
experienced hardship and difficulties in wartime, Li 
educated himself and has used Confucian principles 
throughout his life. 153   In particular, he developed a 
reputation for being polite, trustworthy, hardworking, 
                                                          
 
 
150 See Young, supra note 125, at 9. 
151 Hawes and Chew attribute the success of the Haier Group to Zhang 
Ruimin’s leadership. He defined the organizational culture, created the 
firm’s value and incentivized all employees to work for the company.  He 
also accommodated the company’s 800 workers, kept them motivated and 
provided them with improved working conditions.  See Colin Hawes & Eng 
Chew, The Cultural Transformation of Large Chinese Enterprises into 
Internationally Competitive Corporations: Case Studies of Haier and 
Huawei, 9 J. CHINESE ECON. & BUS. STUD. 67 (2011); Paul McDonald, 
Confucian Foundations to Leadership: A Study of Chinese Business 
Leaders Across Greater China and South-East Asia, 18 ASIA PAC. BUS. 
REV. 465, 476 (2012); Ruimin Zhang, Raising Haier, 85 HARV. BUS. REV. 
141 (2007). 
152 See McDonald, supra note 151, at 477-78. 
153 See id. 
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philanthropic, and loyal to families.154  His nickname in 
Hong Kong, “Superman,” reflects both the success of his 
family business and the exceptional esteem he earned 
among the public in his country. 155   After a 68-year 
career, Li is settling into retirement in 2018.156  
2. Family Ownership 
Consistent with Confucian philosophy, many East 
Asian companies treat their work environment like a 
family household. for example, companies expect 
managers and supervisors to play a role analogous to that 
of family elders.157 Employees often value the feeling of 
belonging to a company—like the feeling of belonging 
to a family—more than they value financial 
compensation.” 158   Empirical studies in recent years 
show that the majority of East Asian firms are owned by 
families,159 and family relationships play a key role in 
                                                          
 
 
154 See id. 
155  See id. See also BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF NEW CHINESE 
ENTREPRENEURS AND BUS. LEADERS 81 (Wenxian Zhang & Ilan Alon eds., 
2009). 
156 See Luisa Kroll, Hong Kong’s Richest, Li Ka-shing, Announces 
Plans to Retire After 68 Years, FORBES (March 16, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/luisakroll/2018/03/16/hong-kongs-richest-li-
ka-shing-announces-plans-to-exit-after-68-years/#57fd102d3436.  
157 See Kee, supra note 83, at 14. 
158 See Lee & Lee, supra note 50, at 36. 
159 See Claessens et al., supra note 134, at 82. 
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business organizations. 160   In Korea, many of the 
sprawling conglomerates, i.e. the chaebol (Samsung 
Electronics, The Hyundai Group, The LG Group, 
Hanjing Group, The Ssangyong Group, etc.), are owned 
and controlled by the families of their respective 
founders.161  It is the chairman’s eldest son or another 
close family member, and not a professional manager, 
that often becomes heir to the corporate throne.162  In the 
Taiwan region, research by Wen-Hsien Tsai on 
Taiwanese family firms shows that, when the 
performance and productivity of managers in family 
firms are poor, the managers are more likely to be 
replaced by other family members than by non-family 
members. 163  The research also suggests family firms 
change CEOs three times more often than non-family 
firms, reflecting the prevalence of managerial-level 
power struggles within the family. 164   Furthermore, 
                                                          
 
 
160 See Xiaowei Luo & Chi-Nien Chung, Keeping It All in the Family: 
The Role of Particularistic Relationships in Business Group Performance 
During Institutional Transition, 50 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 404, 410 (2005). 
161 See Kee, supra note 83, at 16-18. 
162  See Sang-Woo Nam, Business Groups Looted by Controlling 
Families, and the Asian Crisis, 27 ASIAN DEV. BANK INST. RESEARCH PAPER 
SERIES 1, 21 (2001), <https://think-
asia.org/bitstream/handle/11540/4133/2001.11.rp27.controlling.families.cr
isis.pdf?sequence=1>. 
163 See Wen-Hsien Tsai et al., CEO Tenure in Taiwanese Family and 
Nonfamily Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective, 19 FAM. BUS. REV. 11, 
12 (2006). 
164 See id. 
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networks within families are self-dependent and 
closed.165  In Hong Kong, research by Henry Wai-chung 
Yeung shows closed networks may include non-family 
members, but only when they can develop “family-like 
trust.”166  This occurred in the case of Hong Kong Toys 
Ltd. when the Hong Kong-based family firm developed 
its new markets in Singapore. 167   It is argued that 
Confucian values contribute to the success of overseas 
Chinese family firms, and that these firms value mutual 
obligations, cooperation, frugality and hard work—
elements which mitigate the classic principal-agency 
problem where authority is delegated to company 
managers.168   
 The subject of family ties also raises the topic of 
interpersonal networks, specifically as they relate to 
relationships between family businesses and non-family 
                                                          
 
 
165 See Sun-Ki Chai & Mooweon Rhee, Confucian Capitalism and the 
Paradox of Closure and Structural Holes in East Asian Firms, 6 MGMT. & 
ORG. REV. 5, 16 (2010). 
166 See Henry Wai-chung Yeung, Limits to the Growth of Family-
owned Business? The Case of Chinese Transnational Corporations from 
Hong Kong, 14 FAM. BUS. REV. 55 (2000). 
167 See id. 
168 See Irene Yeung & Rosalie Tung, Achieving Business Success in 
Confucian Societies: The Importance of Guanxi (Connections), 25 ORG. 
DYNAMICS 54 (1996); Lee Jean & Francis Tan, Growth of Chinese Family 
Enterprises in Singapore, 14 FAM. BUS. REV. 49 (2001); Eric Tsang, 
Internationalizing the Family Firm: A Case Study of a Chinese Family 
Business, 39 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 88; Whitley, supra note 87. 
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partners or clients.  In mainland China, the business 
network system is often called guanxi.169  In the context 
of guanxi, it is important for entities outside the family, 
such as business partners or clients, to maintain a 
reciprocal relationship with the family business. 170  
Long-term, interpersonal relationships are highly valued, 
and often family businesses prefer to hire family 
members and their relatives.171  These relationships are 
hierarchal in nature; when conflicts arise, the person of 
lower status is expected to find ways of compromise 
without open confrontation.172 
In Korea, the relations established through kin, 
school, or regional ties are defined as yongo.173  Similar 
                                                          
 
 
169 See Chao Chen et al., Chinese Guanxi: An Integrative Review and 
New Directions for Future Research, 9 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 167 (2013) (for 
a review of different guanxi ties). 
170  See Jun Yan & Ritch Sorenson, The Influence of Confucian 
Ideology on Conflict in Chinese Family Business, 4 INT’L J. CROSS CULT. 
MGMT. 5, 11 (2004). 
171 See id.  
172 See id. at 11. See also Yan & Sorenson, supra note 85, at 237 (“The 
basic unit of society is not the individual, but the family. Family is always 
more important than any individual member, and harmony is the most 
important value for all family members. Without harmony, no family can 
stand, neither can a family business.”). See Joyce Leong et al., Perceived 
Effectiveness of Influence Strategies in the United States and Three Chinese 
Societies, 6 INT’L J. CROSS CULT. MGMT. 101 (2006), showing that, in 
contrast to the case of managers in the United States, gentle persuasion may 
not be an effective management tool in mainland China. 
173 See Horak & Klein, supra note 96, at 675. 
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to guanxi networks, the less formal institution of yongo, 
which delineates between in-group and out-group trust 
levels, is considered an efficient alternative to markets 
and hierarchies in business transactions.174  Yongo can 
be developed through sharing the same bases of 
experience such as the same home town (Jiyon), the 
same school (Hakyon), or sharing blood ties or indirect 
family ties through marriage (Hyulyon).175  Therefore, it 
is typical for a Korean to simultaneously belong to 
various associations within the loyalty-based yongo 
network, and yongo is commonly used for daily 
interactions such as exchanging favors, gathering 
information or attaining career achievements. 176  
Hierarchical relationships are a predominant feature of 
the yongo network, and it is often the case that a senior 
can ask a favor from a junior but not vice versa.177  The 
yongo concept is similar to another concept—yonjul—
which also refers to an interpersonal network but which 
is used for a particular and often dubious purpose: for 
                                                          
 
 
174  See id.; see also SEOK-CHUN LEW, THE KOREAN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT PATH: CONFUCIAN TRADITION, AFFECTIVE NETWORK (2013); 
Jaehyuck Lee, Society in a Vortex? Yonjul Network and Civil Society in 
Korea, 40 KOR. J. 366 (2000); Jaeyeol Yee, The Social Networks of 
Koreans, 40 KOR. J. 325 (2000). 
175 See Horak & Klein, supra note 96, at 675.  
176 See id. 
177 See id. 
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example, personal gain through unfair or deceitful 
means.178      
3. Business communities 
As mentioned previously, many business networks in 
East Asia are structured through personal relations and 
family ties.  The guanxi system in China encompasses 
and shapes both the internal relations among family 
members and the complex connections between a given 
entity and its business partners, clients and 
shareholders.179  Individuals and business operators are 
                                                          
 
 
178  See Sven Horak, Antecedents and Characteristics of Informal 
Relation-Based Networks in Korea: Yongo, Yonjul and Inmaek, 20 ASIAN 
PAC. BUS. REV. 78, 89 (2014), (“Yonjul refers to informal and rather 
particular ties between individuals that exist for a purpose.  The word itself 
shares with the word Yongo the ‘yon,’ again standing for ‘tie’, but the 
second syllable—the ‘jul’—translates to ‘rope’ or ‘string.’  The common 
judgement based on the interviews conducted is that the word Yonjul itself 
has a rather negative connotation …, as Yonjul presupposes a purpose or 
intention and objective, such as personal gains.  The purpose of Yonjul ties 
is often to secure favours or benefits granted because of those ties, and not 
based on fair competition or equal treatment.  Examples include, on the 
individual level, the usage of Yonjul for job entry, career progression or the 
acquisition of secret competition-relevant information or, on an 
organizational level, receiving subsidies or securing monopoly rights in the 
market …. Based on the interviews conducted it is clear that Yonjul blurs 
the border between legality and illegality and is often associated with illegal 
transactions.” (citations omitted)). 
179 See Sun-Ki Chai, supra note 165; see Wen-Hsien Tsai, supra note 
163; see also Henry Wai-chung Yeung, supra note 166. 
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interdependent; network circles are cross-connected.180  
In Japan, as William Laufer and Iwao Taka have 
explained, interest groups in one circle often constitute a 
part of another circle, and the hierarchies in each circle 
sometimes overlap.181  Politics play a role as well: for 
example, a company executive may also be a politician’s 
supporter, or he may be a member of one of the advisory 
councils, known as shingikai, that provide input to public 
bodies on questions of policy. 182   Among business 
circles, the government is viewed as having the highest 
position in all the hierarchies within a given industry.183  
Government intervention at all levels of the society has 
traditionally been widely accepted and has even been 
                                                          
 
 
180 See William Laufer & Iwao Taka, Japan, Regulatory Compliance, 
and the Wisdom of Extraterritorial Social Controls, 18 HAST. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 487, 505, 521 (1995). 
181 See id. at 521. 
182  See id. Shingikai are often composed of representatives from 
business, academia, and other sectors to deal with policy questions and 
specialized administrative issues. Since industries and market actors 
generally hope to maintain a good relationship with the regulatory agency, 
regulations and polices are rarely challenged or criticized. See Curtis 
Milhaupt, A Rational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract 
Culture, and the Rule of Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L. J. 3, 31 (1996). 
183 See Laufer & Taka, supra note 180, at 521 (“Private corporations 
or industries, in particular, view the government as occupying the highest 
position in the industrial hierarchies. The government is also perceived as 
an important interconnection among different hierarchies.”). 
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perceived as natural and necessary.184  Attempts have 
been made since 2001 to draw sharper distinctions 
between the State and the market, and in the field of 
competition policy Japan’s engagement is more 
convincing today than it once was.185  Still, the burden 
of history is not easily shrugged off: structural reforms 
have often been stymied, and the interconnections 
between industry, politicians, and agencies of the State 
remain significant.186  The relatively stable hierarchies 
that are part of those interdependent circles generate 
                                                          
 
 
184  See id. at 521 (bureaucratic informalism is “underwritten by a 
consensus among citizens that bureaucratic intervention and informal 
coordination are necessary and meaningful.”). See also FRANK UPHAM, 
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 207 (1987) (extensive 
discussion of Japan’s bureaucratic informalism). 
185 See, e.g., Mel Marquis, Firebird Suite: Cartel Suppression Reborn 
in Japan, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENF. 84 (2016). 
186 See William Pesek, Corporate Japan Thinks it’s 1985, 
BLOOMBERGVIEW, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-06-
15/corporate-japan-thinks-it-s-1985 (last visited August 2, 2018) (“Abe’s 
new initiatives are no match for Japan's traditional ‘iron triangle’—the 
clubby nexus of elected officials, bureaucrats and CEOs that has long 
dominated Japan's economy and resisted any prime minister who dared 
challenge them. That’s not to say change isn’t afoot. Aside from nudging 
corporate boards to add more outsiders and women, Abe’s new regulations 
have forced companies to disclose their policies on cross-shareholdings and 
the exercise of shareholder voting rights. And it’s a sign of progress that 
Japan Exchange recently declared it is ‘ashamed’ at Toshiba’s accounting 
scandal.”); see also, Richard Colignon & Chikaku Usui, The Resilience of 
Japan’s Iron Triangle, 41 ASIAN SURV. 865 (2001).  
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resistance against changes to the status quo.187  Long-
standing and stable interconnected relationships have 
become a particular characteristic intrinsic to social and 
commercial life in Japan. 188   Corporations have 
traditionally prioritized the goal of maintaining stable 
and predictable relationships with other actors (including 
competitors), and this value originates from the Japanese 
conception of “co-existence” or “co-survival” whereby 
opportunities for cooperation and mutual benefit arise 
when, proverbially speaking, people “eat from the same 
rice pot” (onaji kama no meshi wo kū).189 
                                                          
 
 
187 See Pesek, supra note 186. See also Laufer & Taka, supra note 180, 
at 522. 
188  See Sung-Joon Roh, Evolution of “Partnership Rationality” in 
Japan: The Logic of Collaboration between Rival Firms, 22 BUS. & ECON. 
HIST. 138, 141 (1993). 
189  See id. at 145. The present authors have provided the relevant 
Japanese expression and have loosely translated it as “eating from the same 
rice pot” to capture the sense in English whereas Roh refers to rivals eating 
rice together.  The expression onaji kama no meshi wo kū dates back to the 
Tokugawa period in which samurai apprentices lived in common 
dormitories, shared experiences and thereby developed a sense of 
brotherhood, bondedness and solidarity. See Thomas Tudor et al., 
Significant Historic Origins That Influenced the Team Concept in Major 
Japanese Companies, 12 J. APP. BUS. RES. 115, 123 (1996) (citing ROBERT 
MARCH, WORKING FOR A JAPANESE COMPANY: INSIGHTS INTO THE 
MULTICULTURAL WORKPLACE (1992)).    
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D.  CORPORATE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IN 
CHINA, JAPAN AND KOREA: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Among various models on the study of 
organizational culture, the Competing Values 
Framework is one of the most influential models applied 
internationally to test the impact of culture on 
organizational effectiveness,  change, and 
performance.190  The Competing Values Framework is 
also one of the few models that has been used extensively 
in studying Asian firms.191  This model, which was first 
developed by Robert Quinn and John Rohrbaugh, 
identifies two dimensions of organizational 
effectiveness: the vertical axis of stability and control 
versus flexibility and discretion, and the horizontal axis 
of internal focus versus external focus.192  Cameron and 
Quinn later proposed attributes corresponding to the four 
types of organizational culture: Clan, “Adhocracy”, 
                                                          
 
 
190 See Kim Cameron & Robert Quinn, Diagnosing and Changing 
Organizational Culture Based on the Competing Values Framework (3rd 
edn, 2011). 
191  See David Ralston et al., Today’s State-owned Enterprises of 
China: Are They Dying Dinosaurs or Dynamic Dynamos?, 27 Strat. Mgmt. 
J. 825, 830 (2006). 
192  See Robert Quinn & John Rohrbaugh, A Competing Values 
Approach to Organizational Effectiveness, 5 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY REV. 122 
(1981); Robert Quinn & John Rohrbaugh, A Spatial Model of Effectiveness 
Criteria: Towards a Competing Values Approach to Organizational 
Analysis, 29 MGMT. SCI. 363 (1983). 
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Market, and Hierarchy. 193   Clan culture is concerned 
with interpersonal loyalty, relationship building, 
teamwork, trust, and commitment.194  It has a flexible 
internal orientation and indicates the family-type 
atmosphere of the organization.195  Adhocracy culture 
emphasizes entrepreneurship, experimentation, and 
innovation, and attaches importance to individual 
initiative and freedom to react to quick market changes 
and develop new strategies.196  It has a flexible external 
orientation. 197   Market culture values market 
competition, competitiveness, and results, with a focus 
on control and external “winning.”198  Market  culture 
aims at maximizing productivity and profits through 
assessable goals and procedures.199  Hierarchy culture is 
dominated by internal control and bureaucratic, 
formalized rules and procedures. 200   An organization 
with hierarchy culture is governed by predictable and 
stable policies.201 
                                                          
 
 
193 See Cameron & Quinn, supra note 190, at 41-50. 
194 See id. 
195 See id. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. 
198 See id. 
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
201 See id. See also Ralston et al., supra note 191, at 832. 
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 The following three subsections explain the 
relevance of the above-described Competing Values 
Framework for the three jurisdictions discussed in this 
article: China, Japan, and Korea.  Highlighted are 
empirical findings that have emerged by reference to the 
Competing Values Framework approach.   
1. China 
Despite more than two decades of reform, State-
owned enterprises (SOEs) are still pervasive in China’s 
economy; there is no way to seriously discuss economic 
activity or business culture in China without reference to 
SOEs.202  SOEs followed a clan organizational culture 
prior to China’s decision to transition to a more open, 
market-based economy in 1978.203  Under the centrally -
planned economic system, employees were strongly 
oriented toward the internal factors of stability and 
production, and they treated their organization like a 
family.204  However, David Ralston has shown that the 
organizational culture of Chinese SOEs post-1978 has 
been shifting from a clan/hierarchy culture toward a 
market culture, with the least focus on Adhocracy 
                                                          
 
 
202 See generally Sheng Hong & Zhao Nong, CHINA’S STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES: NATURE, PERFORMANCE AND REFORM (2013). 
203 See Ralston et al., supra note 191, at 832. 
204 See id. 
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(innovation, experimentation, and change). 205   The 
executive management system used by SOEs reflects the 
significant influence of Chinese political institutions. 
This system utilizes an institutionalized personnel 
rotation scheme similar to the management of civil 
servants in the government.  In this system, executives 
are mainly incentivized by political promotion.206  Top 
managers of SOEs are frequently rotated across business 
groups to reduce the concentration of managerial power 
and to promote management skillsharing among 
SOEs.207  Empirical studies show that the managerial 
culture of SOEs is “hierarchical” and “paternalistic,” and 
that decision-making power is concentrated.208  
The authors in the above-mentioned Ralston survey 
compared the organizational cultures of SOEs to private-
owned enterprises and foreign-controlled businesses.209  
Their data sample was 435 Chinese managers from three 
                                                          
 
 
205 See id. at 839. 
206  See generally Li-Wen Lin, State Ownership and Corporate 
Governance in China: An Executive Career Approach, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 743 (2013).  
207 See id. 
208 See id.; See also Cherrie Jiuhua Zhu et al., Development of HR 
Practices in Transitional Economies: Evidence from China, 19 INT’L J. 
HUMAN RES. MGMT. 840 (2008); Siew-Huat Kong, An Empirical 
Investigation of Mainland Chinese Organizational Ideology, 5 ASIAN BUS. 
& MGMT. 357 (2006). 
209 See Ralston, supra note 191. 
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ownership types, and the average age of the respondents 
was 35. 210   Their findings show that the executives 
running SOEs have learned market-oriented 
management styles, market strategies, and business 
values.211  In contrast, privately owned enterprises are 
least focused on structure and control (Hierarchy or 
Market culture), and instead they are most oriented 
toward Clan culture, followed by Adhocracy. 212  The 
authors also found that the organizational culture of 
foreign-owned enterprises is balanced across the four 
types, reflecting a managerial strategy of balancing 
traditional Chinese culture with commercial constraints 
and logic.213  
2. Japan 
The Competing Values Framework described above 
has been applied to assess organizational culture in 
                                                          
 
 
210 See id. at 835. 
211 See id. at 838-41.  At page 839, the authors state that their findings 
are “understandable in the sense that management education or learning the 
Western style management theories and practices has been a priority in 
[China’s] reform strategy …. SOE managers, who have been influenced by 
what they have learned about Western business practices, have apparently 
applied them in their organizations.” (citation omitted)). 
212 See id. at 839. 
213 See id.  
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Japanese businesses as well. 214   From October to 
December 2009, Masaki Sugita and Takuya Takahashi 
surveyed numerous Japanese corporations appearing in 
the environmental management rankings of a leading 
daily newspaper called Nippon Keizai Shinbunsya. 215  
The survey, which returned 109 responses, divided 
corporations into their cultural types, as summarized in 
Tables 1 and 2. 216   The Tables are divided into a 
manufacturing category (76 respondents) and a non-
manufacturing (services) category (33 respondents). 217  
The authors of the survey found that Adhocracy culture 
(experimentation and innovation) was positively 
correlated with the better performance in terms of 
environmental management or sustainability 
management. 218   By contrast, excessive Hierarchy 
culture (high stability, predictability, control, and an 
internal focus) correlated negatively with environmental 
management performance.219  For present purposes, it is 
worth noting that Market culture type (demanding 
leaders, results, and winning) and Hierarchy culture 
                                                          
 
 
214  Masaki Sugita & Takuya Takahashi, Influence of Corporate 
Culture on Environmental Management Performance: An Empirical Study 
of Japanese Firms, 22 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENVIRON. MGMT. 182 (2015). 
215 See id.  
216 See id. at 186. 
217 See id. 
218 See id. at 187.  
219 See id.  
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(formality, structure, and efficient procedures) are 
relatively prevalent in both manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing cultures. 220   While inferences must 
remain tentative since industry-specific data are not 
included, these figures may to some extent reflect both 
the competitive pressures that shape the high-
productivity side of Japan’s “dual” economy221 and the 
adherence to formality and ritualized norms in Japanese 
society.222  However, the finding of a Market culture in 
                                                          
 
 
220 See id. at 186. 
221 Many authors have written about Japan’s dual economy, consisting 
of high- (but declining) productivity sectors driven by competition and low-
productivity sectors (including service sectors) where dynamism was often 
dampened by weak competition and sometimes ill-conceived economic 
policies; in some cases there are links between two sides of the productivity 
gap since, for example, inputs from low-productivity sectors may make it 
harder for high-productivity sectors to reach their full potential in terms of 
competitiveness.  For discussion, see, e.g., WILLIAM LEWIS, THE POWER OF 
PRODUCTIVITY: WEALTH, POVERTY AND THE THREAT TO GLOBAL STABILITY 
23-49 (2004); RICHARD KATZ, JAPANESE PHOENIX: THE LONG ROAD TO 
ECONOMIC REVIVAL 40-58 (2003).  See also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC 
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: JAPAN 
OVERVIEW 26-28 (2017) (graphically depicting a decline of productivity in 
Japan in manufacturing and especially non-manufacturing sectors and 
making recommendations to boost productivity).   
222 As McVeigh and others have pointed out, formality and ritualized 
practices permeate Japanese social life.  See Brian McVeigh, Ritualized 
Practices of Everyday Life: Constructing Self, Status, and Social Structure 
in Japan, 8 J. RITUAL STUD. 53 (1994).  There is a “constant emphasis” on 
ceremony and ritual behavior, and the rules of social convention make it 
imperative to know the “right way” to do things.  Id. at 60-64.  At the same 
time, the formality of procedures in Japanese companies co-exists with 
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a significant number (14 of 33) nonmanufacturing 
organizations is somewhat counter-intuitive given the 
relatively low level of productivity in Japan’s 
nonmanufacturing sectors.223 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
informal modes of decision-making.  See Caslav Pejovic, Japanese 
Corporate Governance: Behind Legal Norms, 29 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 
483, 504 (2011) (“In Japan the formal processes are rigid top-down 
involving a kind of ritual formality with importance given to seals and do 
not allow much deviation from the established rules.  On the other hand, the 
informal processes are far more flexible and have a very different logic with 
great importance given to consensus and collective participation in making 
a decision.  This informal way of making decisions through various forms 
of meetings and communications is based on personal relations rather than 
on formal ways of communication.”). 
223 The persistence of low productivity in Japan’s service industries is 
underlined by Haruhiko Kuroda, the current governor of the Bank of Japan.  
As Kuroda points out, the service sector continues to lag behind 
manufacturing, and productivity in services is only around 70 percent of the 
levels prevailing in the US and Europe.  See Leika Kiraha, BOJ Kuroda 
Calls for Raising Japan’s Service-Sector Productivity, REUTERS BUSINESS 
NEWS (March 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-
economy-boj/boj-kuroda-calls-for-raising-japans-service-sector-
productivity-idUSKCN1GR0E0 (last visited August 5, 2018).     
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Table 1 Japanese Manufacturing Corporation 
Initiatives According to Cultural Types  
(Total number = 76) 
Cultural type Number (out of 76 total) 
Clan  16 
Adhocracy  4 
Market  20 
Hierarchy  26 
Clan/Market 3 
Clan/Hierarchy  4 
Adhocracy/Market 1 
Market/Hierarchy  2 
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Table 2 Japanese Nonmanufacturing 
Cooperation Initiatives According to Cultural Types  
(Total number = 33) 
Cultural Type Number (out of 33 total) 
Clan  5 
Adhocracy  1 
Market 14 
Hierarchy  9 
Clan/Market 2 
Market/Hierarchy  2 
 
3. Korea  
 According to a number of studies, Korean 
organizations score most highly for Hierarchy culture, 
followed by Clan culture and Market (results-focused) 
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culture. 224   Their lowest score is for Adhocracy 
(entrepreneurial) culture. 225  Other studies corroborate 
the finding that Korean organizational culture is largely 
associated with Hierarchy culture.226  In a comparative 
study, Ali Dastmalchian examined organizational culture 
in thirty-nine (39) Canadian and forty (40) Korean 
organizations operating in six different industries. 227  
Their data shows that Korean firms, when compared to 
Canadian organizations, exhibit more hierarchy culture 
and are characterized by greater tendencies toward 
rigidity and control. 228  Historically, Korean corporate 
culture offered some advantages, leading to the 
observation that some traditional work culture—like 
loyalty to organizations and superiors, readiness to take 
and execute orders without questioning and sacrificing 
private life—were part of the force that drove the 
government-led economic development and the 
                                                          
 
 
224 See Ali Dastmalchian et al., The Interplay Between Organizational 
and National Cultures: A Comparison of Organizational Practices in 
Canada and South Korea Using the Competing Values Framework, 11 INT. 
J. HUMAN RES. MGMT. 388 (2000). 
225 See id. at 392. 
226 See id. at 392-94. 
227 See id. 
228 See id. at 402, 408 (“the predominance of the hierarchy culture 
among Korean firms irrespective of the industry is apparent from the six 
graphs”; “Canadian organizations showed a considerably higher climate of 
openness and lower climate of rigidity and control than the Korean 
sample.”). 
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consequent expansion of the Korean corporate sector 
during the past several decades. 229   However, recent 
assessments suggest that the traditional tendencies 
toward authoritarianism and rigidity in business are 
holding Korean companies back and hampering their 
global competitiveness.230 
E. INCORPORATING CONSIDERATIONS OF CORPORATE 
CULTURE IN COMPETITION COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES 
IN EAST ASIA 
 It has been noted that Confucian philosophy has 
substantially influenced the values and cultural norms 
that are prevalent in East Asia. 231   Particularly, it is 
suggested that guanxi-type networks, which are 
generally rigid hierarchy-based internal structures, and 
family ownership are particular features that distinguish 
East Asian corporate governance from modern 
governance approaches in the West.232  In the light of 
                                                          
 
 
229 See Editorial notes: Change work culture to improve 
competitiveness: The Korea Herald, THE STRAITS TIMES (March 21, 2016), 
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/change-work-culture-to-
improve-competitiveness-the-korea-herald (last visited August 5, 2018). 
230 See id. (referring to studies linking poor “organizational health” to 
indicators such as top-down command structures, frequent demands that 
employees perform work after hours, unproductive internal meetings, and 
unfair job performance assessments). 
231 See supra section 1. 
232 See supra section 3.  
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research showing that a high degree of “traditionality” is 
relevant to the manner in which employees interact with 
their employers, it is expected that these features of East 
Asian business culture and governance are liable to 
significantly impact the effectiveness of competition 
compliance programs.233  Internal control mechanisms 
may lose their power when employees are concerned that 
reporting misconduct will affect long-term relations, or 
when employees at different levels of a company tend to 
fulfill their duties and obligations based on implicit 
guanxi rules or the equivalent of such rules.  In relation 
to such control mechanisms, Irwin has explained that in 
view of “the Confucian values of loyalty to one’s group, 
respect for superiors in a hierarchy, and avoiding loss of 
‘face,’ the willingness of Chinese to speak up or ‘blow 
the whistle’ on fellow employees if they become aware 
of [an] unethical practice is low.”234     
The investments that firms make in achieving 
compliance with regulation is often motivated according 
                                                          
 
 
233 See Larry Farh et al., Individual-level Cultural Values as 
Moderators of Perceived Organizational Support-Employee Outcome 
Relationships in China: Comparing the Effects of Power Distance and 
Traditionality, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 715 (2007); showing that employees 
with high traditionality in China would react to their employers in 
accordance to social role obligations. 
234 Judith Irwin, Doing Business in China: An Overview of Ethical 
Aspects, INSTITUTE OF BUSINESS ETHICS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6, 16 (2012), 
https://www.ibe.org.uk/userfiles/chinaop.pdf (last visited August 5, 2018). 
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to the expected financial consequences and benefits, 
including the value of avoiding the pain of legal 
sanctions. 235   However, in light of the cultural 
specificities discussed in this article, it is suggested that 
more attention should be given to these other factors.  In 
the following subsections, the implications of the 
Confucian tradition and of local norms for developing 
effective competition compliance in East Asian 
companies are discussed.  Particular attention will be 
given to the duties incumbent on CEOs and senior 
managers, the role of the compliance officer, internal 
control mechanisms, and the education function of the 
compliance program. 
1. Competition Compliance Programs  
Compliance programs are designed to perform three 
main functions. The first function is to educate personnel 
and to provide relevant information about what types of 
conduct are prohibited by antitrust or competition law.236  
The second is to signal to the outside world that the 
                                                          
 
 
235 See, e.g., Donald Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 933, 937 (2017) (stating the basic formula that “[i]f the law 
imposes the right mix of detection and sanctions, firms will for that reason 
alone have an incentive to take steps to reduce legal risk” but also 
recognizing the practical complications arising from imperfect detection 
and a range of other factors). 
236 See, e.g., Wils, supra note 19. 
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company has the commitment and determination to 
comply with competition rules, which contributes to 
building a positive brand for “ethical businesses.” 237  
And the third function is to either prevent 
anticompetitive behavior or, if misconduct has already 
occurred, to detect that misconduct, preferably at an 
early stage. 238   It has been said that the goal of a 
compliance program is to let the businessman feel the 
antitrust laws, and to make him think twice before 
engaging in conduct liable to constitute a violation.239  
This palpable awareness of the law and its consequences 
will thus create conditions in which cartel activity is 
more likely to be avoided.240  This perspective may not 
be sufficiently ambitious.  While it is necessary to clearly 
disseminate information that enables a potential 
infringer to consider the risks and rewards of illicit 
                                                          
 
 
237 See Lachnit, supra note 5, at 35. 
238 Early detection by a company (by way of internal audit and/or 
effective compliance efforts) of its own cartel infringement may enable it to 
benefit from immunity or leniency in any subsequent public enforcement 
proceedings; in some jurisdictions this may also secure benefits for the 
company in the context of private damages claims.  See, e.g., William 
Kolasky, Antitrust Compliance Programs: The Government Perspective, 
address before the Corporate Compliance 2002 Conference, San Francisco, 
July 12, 2002, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/224389.pdf (last 
visited August 8, 2018) (discussing the detection function of compliance 
programs). 
239 See James Withrow, Compliance with the Antitrust Laws, 9 N.Y. L. 
F. 187, 194 (1963). 
240 See Kolasky, supra note 238, at 14. 
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conduct, the deeper objective should be to trigger a 
change in the logic of appropriateness that sets the 
parameters of conduct of that agent.241  If such a change 
is achieved, the agent will act ethically—not necessarily 
due to the hypothetical consequences of a legal regime 
external to the business organization, but as a function of 
the standards for exemplary behavior within the 
environment of the organization.242 
Although there is no internationally accepted one-
size-fits-all template of a competition compliance 
                                                          
 
 
241 On the logic of appropriateness, which may be contrasted with (but 
which in some specific circumstances may overlap and interact with) the 
logic of consequences, see James March & Johan Olsen, The Logic of 
Appropriateness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY 689 
(Goodin et al. eds., 2008). March and Olsen summarize this concept as 
follows: “The logic of appropriateness is a perspective that sees human 
action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behavior, organized 
into institutions. Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, 
rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfill the obligations 
encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community 
or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions.  
Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for 
themselves in a specific type of situation.”  Id. at 689.  A general account is 
given in JAMES MARCH & JOHAN OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS 
(1989).  For the important point that the logic of appropriateness and the 
logic of consequences should not be regarded as necessarily mutually 
exclusive, see Kjell Goldman, Appropriateness and Consequences: The 
Logic of Neo-Institutionalism, 18 GOVERNANCE 35 (2005). 
242 See March & Olsen, supra note 241.  
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program,243 and though competition authorities have not 
officially agreed upon uniform contents for a “good” 
compliance program, 244  many scholars have listed a 
number of key elements that should be incorporated 
                                                          
 
 
243  The Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation 
Working Group on Bribery issued the first international compliance and 
ethics program standard in 2009. The basic elements of this standard are 
applicable to any type of compliance program. See OECD Recommendation 
of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, November 26, 2009, 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44176910.pdf (last visited August 8, 
2018).  See also Banks & Murphy, supra note 3, at 375. Murphy and 
Boehme referred to the 2010 version of the Canadian Competition Bureau’s 
Bulletin on Compliance Programs as an excellent example.  See Joseph 
Murphy & Donna Boehme, Fear No Evil: A Compliance and Ethics 
Professionals’ Response to Dr. Stephan (2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1965733 (last visited August 8, 2018).  See also 
Joseph Murphy, Good News from Canada for the Compliance & Ethics 
Profession, 6 COMP. & ETHICS MAG. 34 (2009).  The Canadian Competition 
Bureau has issued revised Bulletins in 2015 and 2018 which have been 
influential. 
244 See Lachnit, Compliance Programmes, supra note 5, at 41. See also 
Pier Luigi Parcu & Maria Luisa Stasi, Antitrust Compliance Programs in 
Europe: Status Quo and Challenges Ahead, EUI/RSC POLICY BRIEF 2016/1 
(2016), 2, 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/39644/ENTraNCE_PB_2016_
01.pdf?sequence=3 (“While there seems to be a wide and increasing 
consensus among public and private stakeholders around the benefits of 
compliance programs, such benefits are identified and present only in cases 
of ‘good’ programs. Thus, the main challenge lays in the identification of 
what is a ‘good’ compliance program, in order to elaborate best practices 
for its implementation.”). 
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within such a program.245  These include, for example: 
the genuine support of senior managers; the appointment 
of an ethics and compliance officer; the maintenance of 
an internal auditing, monitoring, and reporting system; 
effective communications to ensure that employees are 
fully informed; frequent evaluation of the compliance 
program and improvements where necessary; and 
appropriate risk assessments for anticompetitive 
conduct.246  These ingredients may be further tailored 
and scaled up or down according to a variety of factors 
such as, among others: the size of a company, its 
sophistication and resources, its compliance record, the 
                                                          
 
 
245  See, e.g., William Lawrence, Protecting Against Problems—
Corporate Compliance Programs, 57 ANTITRUST L. J. 601 (1988); Kate 
Taylor & John Pratt, Anti-Trust Compliance Programs, 8 INT’L BUS. L. J. 
981 (1994); Joseph Murphy, How DG Competition and US DOJ Antitrust 
Division Hurt Compliance Efforts, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (Feb. 2012) 1; 
Banks & Murphy, supra note 3, at 381. 
246 See Lawrence, supra note 245; Taylor & Pratt, supra note 245, at 
984-85; Murphy, supra note 245, at 4-5; Banks & Murphy, supra note 3, at 
381. Murphy has argued that the necessary management techniques are very 
extensive, and that there is no easy way to reduce them to a simple list. A 
good compliance program should employ the full range of compliance 
techniques, and the different elements of the program work together 
coherently.  See JOSEPH MURPHY, 501 IDEAS FOR YOUR COMPLIANCE AND 
ETHICS PROGRAM 93-6 (2008); Murphy & Boehme, supra note 243, at 4-5. 
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nature of its activities, the industries in which it operates, 
and, of course, the applicable legal environment.247 
Materials that discuss and encourage compliance 
measures, such as brochures and similar materials, 
PowerPoint slides, and policy books, are common and 
widely distributed. 248   Nevertheless, the training and 
education provided to managers and employees do not 
seem fully effective, and the rate and seriousness of 
antitrust violations, including repeat offenses, persist 
largely unabated.249  That is not to say that PowerPoint 
training is useless—presentations that convey eye-
opening information and provide accurate and 
predictable information for business operators can make 
a key contribution to inducing compliance. 250   It is 
                                                          
 
 
247 See generally INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, The ICC Antitrust 
Compliance Toolkit (2013), 
https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2013/04/ICC-Antitrust-
Compliance-Toolkit-
ENGLISH.pdfhttps://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2013/04/ICC
-Antitrust-Compliance-Toolkit-ENGLISH.pdf (suggesting practical tips for 
building compliance programs). 
248 See generally Banks, supra note 27 (indicating that there is ample 
information available about antitrust in the form of policies, handbooks, 
slides, etc.). 
249  See generally id. (stating that antitrust violations continue 
regardless of access to information). 
250 See generally Murphy & Boehme, supra note 243 (highlighting 
examples of times that employees have admitted to accidental 
noncompliance after receiving proper training on what constitutes 
compliance). 
 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF 
74 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS VOL. 15.1 
 
 
 
doubtful  that a compliance program relying solely on 
classroom-style teaching sessions will make the 
difference between compliance and non-compliance.  
Conceivably, there may even be a risk that a determined 
price-fixer might be emboldened by enhanced 
knowledge about how the enforcement system works 
rather than deterred.251  While it may be useful for a 
company manager to know specifics about the law, such 
as maximum corporate penalties for misconduct, 
focusing too much on such details may dilute the more 
fundamental objective which is to trigger a cultural 
change within the corporate environment.252  From this 
point of view, a policy of promoting effective 
compliance programs requires a solid understanding of 
the relevant corporate culture and the relevant social and 
political norms.  A holistic approach that takes account 
of these factors will help to create a strong and 
sustainable compliance culture at all levels of the 
organization and thus contribute to the success of the 
competition law that applies in a given jurisdiction.  It 
will induce company personnel to develop effective 
internal mechanisms consonant with the external 
regulatory pressure of the law and tailored specifically to 
                                                          
 
 
251 However, a determined price-fixer may of course attempt to engage 
in misconduct irrespective of whether he has a sophisticated understanding 
of the applicable legal prohibitions.  
252  See generally John Galgay, Corporate Plans and Policies for 
Voluntary Antitrust Compliance, 19 BUS. LAW 637 (1964) (suggesting that 
businessmen do not need to understand antitrust law as intimately as an 
antitrust lawyer but having a basic understand will help businessmen see 
that compliance programs are good for businesses). 
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the firm in light of its managerial, corporate, and social 
culture.  As Galgay observed more than fifty years ago, 
compliance efforts should aim to achieve a level of 
sympathetic understanding of the antitrust prohibitions 
which: 
[I]s in the constant and conscious forefront of the 
minds of businessmen, so that [this sympathetic 
understanding] may operate as an ever-present and 
conscious guide in future actions. … [Bringing that 
sympathetic understanding] to the forefront of their minds 
is, it seems to me, the most important task of lawyers 
concerned with compliance programs emphasis added).253  
When a business actor achieves what John Galgay 
calls a sympathetic understanding of the law, a process 
of internalization of norms has taken place; the will to 
comply with the law has become the actor’s own norm 
and has become part of his or her identity.254  Because 
the agenda of promoting sympathetic understanding, 
internalized norms, and the will to comply is effected by 
the interplay between external discipline of the law and 
internal corporate dynamics, the “black box” of the firm 
needs to be uncovered, not only to develop better 
                                                          
 
 
253 Id. at 641. 
254 See George Akerlof & Rachel Kranton, Identity and the Economics 
of Organizations, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 9, 12 (2005) (“Psychologists say that 
people can internalize norms; the norms become their own and guide their 
behavior.”). 
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understandings of the structure and internal governance 
of the organization, but more importantly to understand 
the invisible, and often psychological rules, governing 
the communication channels between managers and 
employees.255 
Regardless of the position competition authorities 
take on the debate about whether compliance programs 
should be taken into account when those authorities 
calculate fines, or whether such programs should be 
made a mandatory condition for the grant of leniency,256 
there is no doubt that several authorities are trying to 
provide both financial and reputational incentives for 
firms to actively invest in compliance programs.257  The 
key issue in making a compliance program effective is 
                                                          
 
 
255 See D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
785, 789 (2013) (indicating that after nearly three decades, the myth of the 
“black box” of the firm is still perpetuated in antitrust scholarship). See 
generally Ronald Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. 
ECON. REV. 713, 714 (1992) (using the “black box” metaphor, which was 
originally used in the very different context of electronic circuit theory and 
cybernetics and later used in numerous other fields, and now appears to have 
been transposed to the subject of corporate behavior).  
256 See generally Fisse, supra note 72 (arguing that corporations should 
not be given any leniency in anti-cartel sanctions against them unless the 
corporation has a compliance program in place). 
257 See Florence Thépot, Can Compliance Programmes Contribute to 
Effective Antitrust Enforcement?, COMPETITION LAW COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAMS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 191 (Johannes Paha ed., 
2016). 
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how an authority can best collaborate with business 
operators to ensure that they internalize the potential 
costs of infringements caused, at least in part, by poor 
corporate governance, and to encourage a change in 
corporate culture so that a compliance culture prevails at 
all levels of the businesses concerned. 258   On the 
corporate side, cultural elements need to be taken into 
account; CEOs, managers, sales staff, and other 
employees at various positions within the corporate 
hierarchy must cooperate and communicate effectively 
and third parties may also be relevantas Nielsen and 
Parker have pointed out, the influence of customers, 
shareholders, business partners, and employees can have 
a significant and positive impact on corporate 
compliance.259 
2. Paternalistic Leadership at CEO and Senior Manager 
Level  
 Although it has been acknowledged that 
competition compliance programs are important, the 
design and implementation of such programs are often 
weak, and while lectures, workshops, and compliance 
                                                          
 
 
258 See Riley & Sokol, supra note 13, at 47-9 (2015). 
259 See Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, To What Extent 
Do Third Parties Influence Business Compliance? 35 J. L. & SOC. 309, 340 
(2008). 
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manuals can be helpful, they are unlikely to suffice.260  It 
is doubtful that a thin or merely pro forma approach to 
compliance will make a difference in securing better 
compliance, at least absent more comprehensive efforts.  
In the context of East Asia, this point is reflected in a 
study by Van Uytsel that led him to conclude that the 
compliance manuals of the large Japanese firms 
surveyed, along with the compliance training sessions 
organized by those firms, are of low value.261 
Therefore, a compliance policy is more likely to be 
successful when it is embedded within the corporate 
culture.262  The policy has to be implemented through the 
continuous dedication and support of managers and 
employees.263  As Stephany Watson advises, there must 
                                                          
 
 
260 See, e.g., Joseph Murphy, Promoting Compliance with Competition 
Law: Do Compliance and Ethics Programs Have a Role to Play? ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (2012) at 251-52 (“In the past companies 
might have satisfied themselves that they were doing ‘all they could 
possibly do’ by sending out codes and manuals, having employees sign 
certifications, and having lawyers give lectures on the statutes but this is no 
longer considered an effective approach.”). 
261 See Steven Van Uytsel, Leniency in Japan—An Empirical Survey 
of its Use (2015), at 18-20, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2692445. 
262  See Rachel Taylor, A Cultural Revolution: The Demise of 
Corporate Culture Through the Whistleblower Bounty Provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 15 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. LAW 69, 78 (2013). 
263 See Stephany Watson, Fostering Positive Corporate Culture in the 
Post-Enron Era, 6 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 7 (2004). 
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be specific individuals “from top to bottom” that are 
responsible for building a strong compliance culture.264  
Companies must promote This compliance culture 
through building trust, commitment, and cooperation 
between employees. 265   The most responsible public 
companies have devoted significant efforts to promoting 
trust, ethics, and good compliance practices, which are 
positively correlated with business success, and 
companies with a strong and sustainable culture of 
voluntary compliance at all levels can derive substantial 
value from their compliance efforts.266   
The paternalistic leadership style in East Asian 
companies suggests that senior managers and employees 
are expected to fulfill mutual obligations. 267  
Subordinates are willing to perform the tasks that their 
senior managers assign to them, and father-like 
managers, who provide support and protection for the 
employees’ professional (and sometimes even personal) 
                                                          
 
 
264 See id. at 38. 
265 See id. at 31-2. 
266 See Taylor, supra note 262, at 81-5 (2013). 
267 Paternalistic leadership is also observed in countries such as India, 
Turkey and Mexico, among others.  See Zeynep Aycan et al., Impact of 
Culture on Human Resource Management Practices: A 10-Country 
Comparison, 49 APPLIED PSYCH.: AN INT’L REV. 192 (2000); Ekin 
Pellegrini & Terri Scandura, Paternalistic Leadership: A Review and 
Agenda for Future Research, 34 J. MGMT. 566 (2008). 
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lives, repay subordinates’ obedient behavior. 268  
However, since leaders and subordinates are engaged in 
a long-term reciprocal relationship of a very broad scope 
that extends to personal and affective-emotional 
dimensions,269 employees in East Asian firms may be 
less willing to “blow the whistle” by reporting the 
misconduct of managers or other employees, or by 
coming clean about their own transgressions.270  Indeed, 
the fact that CEOs and senior managers in East Asia 
often play a paternal role might have the effect of 
intensifying the “loss of face” that may come with self-
reporting misconduct and correcting past errors.271  
                                                          
 
 
268 See Pellegrini & Scandura, supra note 267, at 567; Ying Chen et 
al., Supervisor-Subordinate Guanxi: Developing a Three-Dimensional 
Model and Scale, 5 MGMT & ORG. REV. 375, 378 (2009) (suggesting that 
there are three key components of the supervisor-subordinate guanxi 
relationship: affective attachment, personal life inclusion, and deference to 
the supervisor). 
269 See Xiao-Ping Chen et al., Affective Trust in Chinese Leaders: 
Linking Paternalistic Leadership to Employee Performance, 40 J. MGMT. 
796, 802 (2014). 
270 See Irwin, supra note 234, at 16.  See also Bor-Shiuan Cheng et al., 
A Triad Model of Paternalistic Leadership: Evidence from Business 
Organizations in Mainland China, 20 INDIGENOUS PSYCH. RES. CHINESE 
SOC’Y. 209 (2003); Tsung-Yu Wu et al., Expressing or Suppressing Anger: 
Subordinate’s Anger Responses to Supervisors’ Authoritarian Behaviors in 
a Taiwan Enterprise, 18 INDIGENOUS PSYCH. RES. CHINESE SOC’Y. 3 (2002). 
271  See P. CHRISTOPHER EARLEY, FACE, HARMONY AND SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE: AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR ACROSS 
CULTURES 137 (Oxford University, 1st ed. 1997) (explaining the nexus 
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Many empirical studies show that a serious 
commitment to compliance must be observed at the 
highest echelons of the organization.272  For example, on 
the basis of their examination of forty-three (43) antitrust 
cases covering a span of twenty (22) years, Sally 
Simpson and Christopher Koper argue that, compared 
with other factors, antitrust violations are most likely to 
be correlated with managerial variables that depend on 
the characteristics of a company’s top leadership. 273  
                                                          
 
 
between the importance of face in East Asian societies and the collectivism 
prevailing in those societies); See also Hsien Chin Hu, The Chinese 
Concepts of Face, 46 AM. ANTHROP. 45, 61 (1944) (linking social standing 
and the fear of isolation and noting that “[i]n extreme cases the realization 
that one’s conduct has been damned by group standards drives an individual 
to suicide.”); See Qiumin Dong & Yu-Feng L. Lee, The Chinese Concept of 
Face: A Perspective for Business Communicators, 20 J. BUS. & SOC. 204, 
205 (2007) (noting in Chinese and other group-oriented Asian cultures, a 
“loss of face” is closely associated with a loss of status within a given social 
network. Conversely, a gain of face indicates enhanced respect or attention 
from others in the network.). 
272 See, e.g., Sally Simpson & Christopher Koper, The Changing of the 
Guard: Top Management Team Characteristics, Organizational Strain, and 
Antitrust Offending, 1960-1986, 13 J. QUANT. CRIM. 373 (1997). 
273 See id. at 394 (finding that “chief executive officers from certain 
subunits, most notably finance and administration, increase company 
involvement in antitrust offending. To the extent that the philosophies of 
finance and administration are used to assess problems and promote 
solutions within the organization, internal strain [from poor or declining 
corporate performance, or from the fear thereof] may develop among 
managers, subunits, and divisions, as resources, power, and upward 
mobility are all affected by bottom-line performance criteria. These results 
lend credence to… speculation of almost two decades ago that an 
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Another study focusing on forty (40) international cartels 
prosecuted in Europe and the U.S. from 1998 to 2008 
shows that most episodes of collusion were organized by 
senior managers such as general managers, heads of 
sales, company presidents and vice-presidents, 
managing directors and CEOs. 274   The resulting 
argument that the top corporate leadership must set the 
tone for compliance at all levels of the firm applies a 
fortiori in Confucian societies where hierarchical 
leadership and patriarchal relationships are prominent 
and where loyalty and obedience are expected from 
subordinates.275  In this context, the external discipline of 
the law may seem quite remote compared to the 
immediacy of the norms that apply within the confines 
of the organization.  Therefore, the efficacy of the law 
may depend to a great degree on whether the corporate 
leadership’s commitment to compliance is genuine and 
sufficiently visible within the firm, and whether the 
                                                          
 
 
overemphasis on organizational goals [in this case efficiency] may come 
with an unanticipated price.”). 
274 See Andreas Stephan, Hear No Evil, See No Evil: Why Antitrust 
Compliance Programmes May Be Ineffective at Preventing Cartels, ESRC 
CENTRE COMP. POLICY & NORWICH L. SCH. 8-9, 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8256108/CCP+Worki
ng+Paper+09-09.pdf/9d0cd693-8796-408c-b6eb-90b414d1ecf3 (last 
visited August 8, 2018). 
275 See Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 254 (noting the emphasis on the 
internalization of norms, which shapes an actor’s identity).  
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requirements of relevant legal norms are translated 
within the firm into social norms that employees then 
internalize and make their own. 276   Of course, tone-
setting is important at lower levels of the organization as 
well, 277 but the “tone at the top” is the indispensable 
driving force for the whole company’s investment in 
compliance. 278   In scenarios where senior executives 
have disproportionate importance in corporate 
governance, 279  it is essential to ensure that their 
commitment to antitrust compliance is beyond 
question.280  In this context, where a  business’ authority 
is highly centralized, an executive must act as a role 
                                                          
 
 
276 See Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 254 (noting the emphasis on the 
internalization of norms, which shapes an actor’s identity).   
277 See Hon. Patti Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Remarks at 
the 12th Annual Compliance & Ethics Institute (Oct. 7, 2013) 
(http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/organizational-
guidelines/special-reports/saris-remarks-annual-compliance-and-ethics-
institute.pdf). 
278 See Susan Lorde Martin, Compliance Officers: More Jobs, More 
Responsibility, More Liability, 29 NOTRE DAME J. LAW, ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 169, 187 (2015). 
279 See Len Gainsford & Angus Young, Compliance Heroes, 
Leadership, and Ethnical Values: In Search of a Chinese Benchmark (Aug. 
31, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1464602 
(last visited August 8, 2018). 
280 See Sokol & Abrantes-Metz, supra note 19, at 593 (“The CEO must 
project a sincere desire to comply.  This will set the tone for the entire 
organization in terms of its antitrust compliance.  The CEO must be fully 
committed to the antitrust compliance program and be consistent in such 
commitment.”). 
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model for the company.  As Confucius once said in plain 
terms: if the leader acts properly, the common people 
will obey him without being ordered to; if the leader does 
not act properly, the common people will not obey him 
even after repeated injunctions.281 
3. The Compliance Officer  
A company’s chief compliance and ethics officer is 
a core element of an effective compliance program.282  
Ideally, this person should play a direct and central role 
in ensuring the success of the program.283 They should 
be independent in performing their  duties, highly trusted 
                                                          
 
 
281 K.C.P. Low & Sik-Liong Ang, Confucian Leadership and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): The Way Forward, 2 ASIAN J. BUS. 
RES. 85, 88 (2012) (quoting Analects of Confucius, XIII:6). 
282  See generally Deborah DeMott, The Crucial but (Potentially) 
Precarious Position of the Chief Compliance Officer, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 56, 59 (2013) (discussing compliance and the role of 
compliance officers with reference to financial and banking scandals); John 
Krenitsky, Defining the Chief Compliance Officer Role, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. 
REV. 303, 311 (2017) (noting the potential complexity facing compliance 
officers due to the numerous regulatory fields that may apply in the 
corporate context and pointing out that responsibilities for compliance may 
well have to be divided among different specialists and coordinated by the 
chief compliance officer.). 
283  See Banks & Murphy, supra note 3, at 381 (calling for “[a]n 
empowered, senior officer-level chief ethics and compliance officer with 
sufficient autonomy, empowerment, and resources. If there is not a strong 
compliance and ethics officer at the top, the program may be nothing more 
than a corporate decoration.”). 
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and visible to all employees, and well-informed about all 
aspects of the company’s compliance program.284  They 
should not wear multiple  or conflicting hats; playing the 
part of teammate in one meeting and referee in the 
next. 285   The notion of establishing a dedicated 
compliance officer within the management structure and 
of situating that officer in an independent compliance 
department is relatively new. 286   Traditionally, 
compliance matters were typically handled by the 
company’s general counsel or by a subordinate. in some 
organizations, this trend is still the norm.287  In a survey 
by the Association of Corporate Counsel in 2010, nearly 
half of the respondents confirmed that either the general 
counsel was the chief compliance officer, or that 
compliance was part of the general counsel’s duties.288  
Similarly, in  a 2013 Corpedia survey in which 630 
compliance professionals participated, only thirty-six 
percent (36%) answered that they reported to the general 
counsel.289  Of course, separating the compliance officer 
                                                          
 
 
284 See Lachnit, supra note 5, at 43. 
285 See John McNeece IV, The Ethical Conflicts of the Hybrid General 
Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677 
(2012). 
286 See Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why 
Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 71, 
75 (2014). 
287 See id. at 74. 
288 See id. at 99. 
289 Id. 
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from the legal department is only realistic if it is possible 
to allocate substantial budget and decision-making 
power to separate compliance personnel. 290   The 
arguments for establishing a separate and autonomous 
compliance department to encourage intramural 
competition leading to better compliance practices 291 
seem to be less compelling when the management 
structure of a company is highly centralized, and where 
bottom-up and cross-department communication is 
weak. 292 
Another issue is whether East Asian firms are willing 
to hire in-house lawyers as independent compliance 
officers. 293   In a survey of ninety-seven (97) listed 
companies in Shenyang, Shenzhen and Shanghai, 51.5 
percent of the respondents replied that the company had 
hired in-house lawyers, but the number of lawyers hired 
was either one or two. 294   Thirty-four percent (34%) 
answered that they had not hired any in-house lawyers, 
and 14.4 percent  did not provide an answer.295  The most 
                                                          
 
 
290 See id. at 82. 
291 See id. at 83. 
292 See id. 
293  See generally Kota Fukui, On Prevailing Corporate Legal 
Compliance: Comparative Empirical Study on Need for Lawyers in 
Corporations in China and Japan, 63 OSAKA U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016). 
294 See id. at 4. 
295 See id. 
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frequent answer for not hiring an in-house lawyer was 
either that there was, “no work that needs a lawyer’s 
help,” or that the company did not have a sufficiently 
organized structure to use a lawyer.296  When asked to 
describe the ideal type of in-house lawyer, the most 
common response valued the “general counsel type” 
(29.9%). 297   This implies that in-house lawyers are 
expected to hold an authoritarian position similar to the 
executive directors and to work closely with the 
executive body on legal issues.298  When asked about the 
capacities and personal attributes most desired for in-
house lawyers, respondents identified a “sense of 
commitment” (62.9%) and “loyalty to the corporation” 
(56.7%).299  Since the task of implementing a corporate 
compliance program is often discharged by a company’s 
Chief Legal Officer and carried out by in-house 
corporate lawyers,300 these answers might indicate that 
the role and function of the compliance officer in 
Chinese firms are similar to those of a senior executive 
as opposed to a fully independent professional.  In 
                                                          
 
 
296 See id. at 4-5.  
297 See id. at 9. 
298 See id. 
299 See id. 
300 See Robert Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate 
Counsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L. J. 203, 203 (2016).  See 
also Riley & Sokol, supra note 13, at 6. 
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smaller companies, it may be more realistic to let the 
CEO take responsibility for compliance. 
4. Effective Communication and Education   
Many empirical studies on unethical and illegal 
conduct show that the reason some managers violate the 
law is not because they are oblivious to legal 
prohibitions—the prohibitions are deliberately 
disregarded. 301   In a study surveying 2,321 business 
firms to assess the deterrent effect of the criminalization 
of cartel conduct by the Australian Parliament in July 
2009 (given effect by the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010), Parker and Nielsen showed that the very 
serious applicable sanctions and other consequences—
including criminal penalties, corporate fines, and private 
actions for damages—had little impact on compliance 
management.302  Furthermore, there was no correlation 
between the fear of being punished and any change in 
compliance performance. 303   Recent empirical studies 
show that informing industry of legal sanctions does not 
                                                          
 
 
301 See Parker & Nielson, Deterrence and the Impact, supra note 16, 
at 386. 
302 See id. at 393. 
303 See id. at 406. 
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deter until the prohibited conduct is perceived to be 
sufficiently associated with moral opprobrium.304 
The findings of the above studies call for further 
reflection on the issue of how managers and employees 
could be trained to comply with the requirements of 
competition law and policy.  The notion that the risk of 
significant sanctions and possible detection alone suffice 
to stimulate compliance is increasingly archaic. 305  
                                                          
 
 
304 See N. Craig Smith et al., Why Managers Fail to Do the Right 
Thing: An Empirical Study of Unethical and Illegal Conduct, 17 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 633 (2007). See also Tom Tyler et al., The Ethical Commitment 
to Compliance: Building Value-Based Cultures, 50 CALIF. MGMT REV. 31, 
34 (2008) (finding over 80 percent of the sample of compliance choices 
made by employees were incentivized by internal judgements on right and 
wrong, and by perceptions regarding the legitimacy of the manager’s 
authority.  Only, whereas only 20 percent of the compliance choices were 
motivated by concerns about being punished.).   
305  See, e.g., Maurice Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & 
Compliance Programs, 39 J. CORP. L. 769, 769 (2014). Stucke distinguishes 
between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” approaches to compliance.  An intrinsic 
approach involves the development of an ethical culture within a company 
for its own sake (i.e., for moral reasons), and not to tradeoff between the 
costs and benefits of lawful versus unlawful conduct.  See id. at 825.  In 
reaction to this dichotomy between intrinsic and extrinsic compliance, Ma 
and Marquis have cautioned that “it may not be prudent to establish a strict 
hierarchy between an ethics-based approach and a more calculative 
approach focused on tradeoffs.  Maintaining conditions that favor both self-
rewarding and materially rewarding benefits in parallel may be desirable 
insofar as these benefits may have mutually reinforcing effects.”  Ma & 
Marquis, supra note 79, at 40 n. 368.  However, the latter authors endorsed 
Stucke’s suggestion that “too much emphasis has been placed on material, 
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Consequently, it is necessary to develop a strategy that 
takes account of the social construction of compliance 
and the need to understand and then shape, where 
necessary, the logic of appropriateness that prevails 
within the walls of an organization.   
In the context of East Asia, part of the strategy should 
build on the cultural-historical infrastructure which 
underlies commercial life, as outlined in this article.  
Confucian doctrines could thus be applied as part of the 
effort to educate corporate leaders306 and employees and 
build moral engagement on the subject of cartel 
activities.  Confucian ethics emphasize the importance of 
moral education, and it is usually the responsibility of 
parents and leaders to educate children and subordinates 
with moral codes; the ideal result is to produce a “moral 
gentleman” (junzi). 307   The Confucian system of 
                                                          
 
 
cost-benefit reasoning, and not enough on the idea that doing the ‘right 
thing’ and implementing ethical leadership are self-justifying pursuits.”   
306 To some extent, this idea may also apply to top leadership and 
company managers. However, top management bears additional 
responsibility in that they must actively take the steps necessary to ensure 
an adequate compliance culture throughout the organization. This entails, 
among other things, a more proactive approach to learning, including self-
education, as compared to the typical Confucian learning style.  See Baiyin 
Yang et al., Confucian View of Learning and Implications for Developing 
Human Resources, 8 ADVANCES DEVELOPING HUMAN RES. 346, 349 (2006). 
307  See Chau-kiu Cheung & Andrew Chi-fai Chan, Philosophical 
Foundations of Eminent Hong Kong Chinese CEOs’ Leadership, 60 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 47, 49 (2005). 
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teaching and education attaches high value to morality 
and social responsibility and less attention is given to 
discovering the truth. 308   Learners usually prefer an 
accurate, systematic, and slow approach when receiving 
instructions, and teachers usually employ tools such as 
lists, rote memorization, and repetition. 309   Since 
employees are accustomed to an instructor-centered 
approach to education, and since they rarely express 
dissent or personal opinions in front of a group, 310 
providing a list of “do’s” and “don’ts” through formal 
training courses might be manageable and easy to 
implement.  While employees in countries with 
Confucian traditions may prefer a more systematic, slow 
approach compared to the interactive, spontaneous, and 
quick approach often seen in western countries,311 it is 
crucial to ensure that employees understand why and 
how the compliance program is implemented—to show 
why cartel behavior is unambiguously unethical.  
Although it is simple and expedient for multinational 
corporations with subsidiaries spread across continents 
to give employees slide presentations outlining the finer 
                                                          
 
 
308 See Yang et al., supra note 306, at 351. 
309 See id. at 349. 
310 See id. at 352. 
311 See id. at 351-52. 
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points of competition law, 312  it is more important to 
instill the idea that conduct such as fixing prices or 
colluding on tenders is tainted with moral stigma and 
leads to a loss of face for the individuals concerned and 
for the entire organization.313  Teaching employees that 
cartel conduct is unambiguously unethical and raising 
the specter of social stigma are more likely to be more 
effective than emphasizing the threat of severe 
administrative and/or criminal sanctions.  The Confucian 
value of moral “righteousness” (yi) is taught in East 
Asian countries, and the sense of right or wrong is 
cultivated through the transmission and absorption of 
moral rules.314  It follows that explicitly moral messages 
should be a natural part of a company’s efforts to shape 
the norms and behavior of employees. 315   Moreover, 
                                                          
 
 
312  See Michele Lee, Building an Effective Antitrust Compliance 
Program: International and Cultural Challenges, ANTITRUST COMP. BULL. 
16, 18 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law, March 2006). 
313 See Tsung-Yu Wu et al., supra note 270. 
314  See, e.g., Mei-Ju Chou et al., Confucianism and Character 
Education: A Chinese View, 9 J. SOC. SCI. 59, 64 (2013) (“Character 
education has provided the means by which the values and teachings of 
Confucius has been transmitted to the people.”). 
315  Educators in the field of business ethics are also calling for a 
synthesis of the Confucian virtues and the more modern business ethos 
associated with globalized business.  See Peter Woods & David Lamond, 
Junzi and Rushang: A Confucian Approach to Business Ethics, A 
CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CONTEXT, 3 (2011) https://www.anzam.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf-manager/623_ANZAM2011-434.PDF (“The ideal 
new Confucian business person in the modern day would be a virtuous 
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tapping into Confucian-oriented moral education to 
implement compliance concepts is also consistent with 
the argument that the command-and-control style of 
compliance education should be de-emphasized in favor 
of value-based compliance training.316  In this vein, and 
as empiricists suggest creating identity between the 
values of the company and the values of its employees, 
and making ethical rules and boundaries credible, are 
elements more apt to secure compliance than relying on 
either command-and-control mechanisms or carrots and 
sticks.317  Indeed, it may be that aspiring to compliance 
is not aiming high enough.  In the East Asian context, a 
more ambitious and fruitful objective would be to 
cultivate virtue at all levels of a company, and to instill 
the idea that lawfully competitive conduct is a necessary 
                                                          
 
 
business person who possess qualities such as benevolence (ren), 
[righteousness] (yi), propriety (li), wisdom (zhi), and trustworthiness (xin), 
meantime, the business person is able to make use the advanced 
management techniques from the Western world.”). 
316 See Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating 
Compliance Through Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 961, 975 (2012). 
317 See id. at 375-77; See also Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing 
Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CALIF. 
MGMT. REV. 131, 135-36 (1999). 
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part of virtuous conduct that enables the company to 
flourish as a good corporate citizen.318    
5. Cultural Changes to Shape Business Incentives 
 In the many countries where competition law is 
not a long-standing tradition, business executives and 
employees may not be fully aware of the illegality of 
cartel activities (all the more so in the case of SMEs), 
and they may be either unaware of leniency programs or 
may have only weak incentives to use such programs to 
report violations to the competent authorities. 319  
                                                          
 
 
318 See Woods & Lamond, supra note 315, at 8, (as noted above, others 
have likewise called for a more explicit virtue-based approach to good 
business ethics.).   
319 Indonesia is an example of a developing country where competition 
law has been in place for two decades, yet there is still limited cognizance 
of the law among the business community.  However, the strong outreach 
efforts of the Indonesian competition authority have raised the level of 
business awareness.  See Deswin Nur, Understanding the Competition Law 
and Policy of Indonesia, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 1, 9 (2015).  Nur refers to 
two studies conducted by the Indonesian competition authority in 2009 and 
2014 to measure awareness on the part of businesses in metropolitan Jakarta 
with regard to the existence of the applicable competition law. Id.  In 2009, 
only 26 percent of surveyed businesses were aware of the law even after 
about nine years of enforcement. Id.  However, following intensive outreach 
efforts, the figure increased to 60 percent by 2014. Id.  Experience from the 
UK indicates that low business awareness of competition law can be a 
significant issue even in a developed country where the law has been 
applied actively by the national and European competition authorities.  As 
summarized by O’Regan, research published in 2014 showed that only 30% 
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Inducing competition compliance would not only require 
the development of an internal mechanism to facilitate 
the function of the compliance programs, but also to 
change business incentives to promote compliance ethics 
and competition values.320  The path-dependent legacy 
of Confucianism in East Asian countries implies that the 
government and relevant executive organs and enforcers 
wield abundant influence and are well-placed to promote 
competition culture and compliance and to actively 
shape appropriate incentives for business operators.  But 
in order to ensure that such incentives are established, a 
fundamental (though not sufficient) condition for 
success is political will.321  It is already well known that 
enforcing laws against cartels in countries with weak 
political support for competition policy is extremely 
challenging. 322   Indeed, to achieve legal and cultural 
                                                          
 
 
of UK businesses knew that market sharing was illegal, and only 55% of 
UK businesses knew that price fixing was illegal.  See Matthew O’Regan, 
Criminal Enforcement of Competition Law: The UK Experience 1, 2 (2017), 
http://www.stjohnschambers.co.uk/dashboard/wp-content/uploads/MO-
Advanced-EU-Competition-Law.pdf.       
320 See generally, Riley & Sokol, supra note 13. 
321  “The introduction and implementation of a competition law is 
fraught with problems.  Political will is necessary every step of the way.”  
SUSAN JOEKES & PHIL EVANS, COMPETITION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE 
POWER OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS 61 (2008). 
322 See, e.g., Rijit Sengupta & Cornelius Dube, Competition Policy 
Enforcement: Experiences from Developing Countries and Implications for 
Investment, OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT VII, 10 
(2008), http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40303419.pdf (“In 
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change in societies where the government historically 
encouraged cartel behavior, it was necessary for 
institutional elites to repudiate misguided policies which 
caused a cultural and behavioral tipping point.323  Where 
this process of legal and cultural change does not take 
hold and where efforts fail to reach the tipping point, 
there will be a lack of “moral seriousness” with regard to 
cartels; without moral seriousness, it will be difficult if 
not impossible to create and reinforce an anti-cartel 
social norm among the public, and to attach serious 
social stigma to cartel behavior. 324   People are only 
likely to comply with a behavioral law if they believe in 
the “legitimate authority” of the law and of the agency 
that enforces it.325  In this light, it is crucial to consider 
                                                          
 
 
many countries, governments are seen not to have any plans or commitment 
to the promotion of competition in the market.  Such apathy could be a result 
of a pre-determined approach to evolving the market, or merely a lack of 
awareness of the economic benefits of competition.”). 
323  A dramatic example of a country where a cartel culture has 
successfully transformed into a competition culture that embraces the 
functioning of markets and the application of competition law is Germany.  
See generally David Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German 
Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the New Europe, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 
25 (1994) (tracing a broad arc of twentieth century history in which, among 
other things, Germany’s cartel economy in the 1930s and 1940s was 
repudiated notably in 1958 with the adoption of Germany’s modern 
competition law and cartel prohibition).  
324 See Cf. Parker, supra note 16. 
325 See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); Tom Tyler & 
John Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views about 
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how regulatory schemes and enforcement tools could be 
adapted to change a firm’s behavior. For example, 
behavior may be modified when granting conditional 
fine reductions or conditionally immunizing a firm from 
criminal liability when it can show a good faith effort to 
comply notwithstanding the infraction for which it was 
investigated.326 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article has expressed the view that efforts to 
secure competition law compliance among commercial 
operators can be tailored in a way that takes account of 
cultural characteristics.  The cultural background forms 
part of the conditions in which the development of a 
robust and credible compliance system occurs.  
Therefore, it makes sense to approach compliance issues 
in a manner sensitive to that cultural background.  In the 
context of East Asian enterprises, this implies a need to 
take account of the legacy of Confucian ethics, which has 
had a profound influence on the psychology and 
behavior of commercial organizations in the region.  The 
importance of that legacy suggests that compliance will 
                                                          
 
 
Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account when 
Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 735 (2000). 
326 For comprehensive discussion, see Stucke, In Search of, supra note 
305.  We note that the research conducted thus far on compliance has not 
unambiguously established, in empirical terms, that the offer of specific 
rewards by enforcement authorities guarantees that the business community 
as a whole will make a deeper commitment to compliance.  Nevertheless, 
we consider that visible signs of commitment to “compliance policy” on the 
part of enforcers can send important and valuable signals to enterprises and 
to the wider public. 
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not be achieved within East Asian firms solely based on 
the external legal environment; an environment in which 
deterrence-oriented factors such as sanctions and the 
threat of detection play a central role.  More attention 
should be given to the internal moral and social 
environment, and to the logic of appropriateness within 
a given firm.  A compliance culture can thus be 
constructed on the basis of elements such as moral 
commitment, Eastern-style education, the cultivation of 
virtue and a convergence between the interests of the 
enterprise and those of its employees. 
